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One. Pictorialism and Purism in photography – short history of a long 
controversy 
Introduction 
At the beginning of it, photography was… photography. Without too many 
discrepancies within its own context or playground. Much like the humans, who were 
enjoying the garden of Eden without realizing they were quite different. After committing 
the original sin – which probably became a sin only apocryphally – there were men and 
women. Or, respectively, Pictorialist photographers and Purist photographers. And as 
always when we’re talking about dichotomies, the difference is almost never that big as it 
is implied to be…  
Pictorialism appeared in England during the Victorian epoch. Its origins seem to be 
related with the use of gum bichromate1 process, special substances and proceedings2, 
tangential to the classical materials and techniques applied in photography. At its 
beginnings, the Pictorialist photography was trying to replicate famous paintings and 
religious scenes, but then evolved towards a much more subliminal interpretation of the 
“picturesque”, retaining only its hint, its suggestibility as main facet of its approach. 
Pictorialism’s main intention is to facilitate personal expression and to “use” the camera 
– or the analog tools3 – with the finality of creating something beautiful or “expressive”.                                                         1 Gum bichromate is a 19th century photographic printing process based on the light sensitivity of 
dichromates. It is capable of rendering painterly images from photographic negatives. Gum printing 
is traditionally a multi-layered printing process, but satisfactory results may be obtained from a 
single pass. Any color can be used for gum printing, so natural-color photographs are also possible 
by using this technique in layers. 2 These proceedings includes the use of the calotype, a specific photographic print invented by 
William Henry Fox Talbot in 1840. A special tipe of paper was exposed during the making of the 
photograph, paper from which, afterwards, could be obtained positive paper prints. These final prints 
were somehow blurred due to the nature of the paper negative. Also, the intermediary negative 
allowed all types of corrections or inteventions. Other preferences comprised using soft focus, in 
order to create the atmosphere of a painting, photo filters and coatings, and unusual printing 
methods, such as cyanotype and platinotype. 3 This observation refers to the practice of taking photos without a camera, directly imprinting the 
silhouette of an object onto a surface treated with photo-sensitive emulsion, and exposing it to light. 
These types of images obtained in this manner are called photograms. Fox Talbot, one of the first 
and most famous Pictorialists, used to call these images photogenic drawings, or shadowgraphs. 
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Therefore, it usually involves a preparation phase, consisting of choosing a theme, 
finding a way to render it, encountering the appropriate manner of expressing it, 
constructing the scene etc., and sometimes also a post processing phase. The post 
processing phase differs immensely nowadays, obviously, from what it was back then, 
due to the huge progresses realized in the field of creating and manipulating images. All 
this complex process foster the implicit idea that photography is an art and consequently 
it can lead to the creation of artworks. From this point of view, it clearly results that the 
photographer-artist is free to make use of any methods he/she finds appropriate in order 
to express his/her vision, the camera being only an instrument and the photography only a 
mean of achieving this vision. 
Purism was – only naturally – a reaction to this view about photography. It began in 
France around the end of World War I and mainly outlines the fact that photography is a 
unique craft, that cannot and may not borrow ideas or savoir-faire from painting or any 
other art forms. The expression in photography, it says, must be circumscribed to the 
nature of this peculiar medium, photography being a finality in itself and not a way to 
achieve a certain “artistic” vision. It is based in the fervent belief that the strict 
observance of its rules and results makes photography what it is, and the import of 
techniques or concepts from other imaging fields is nothing but a contamination. The post 
processing is almost always austerely prohibited, and the “pre-fabrication” of the images 
is an a priori rejection. Purism strives to obtain the most out of the “purely” photographic 
act, being in this regard an admirable effort, for it sustains and nourishes the 
perfectionism and strict diligence of this technique, promoting further knowledge and 
exploit of its attributes. 
Among the Pictorialists, names such as Henry Peach Robinson, Oscar Gustave 
Rejlander, Henry Fox Talbot, Julia Margaret Cameron, Lewis Carroll, Lady Hawarden 
are notable for the first phase of the movement, as for the second wave of Pictorialism, of                                                         
Anna Atkins, conational of Fox Talbot, published a collection of such images of botanical species, 
realized by cyanotyping; and Man Ray, the American-Paris based artist, was also affectionate toward 
this kind of images, that he called rayographs, re-discovered by him by accident, when his girlfriend-
photographer Lee Miller opened the door of the dark room while he was developping photos. 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a more international scope, the most renowned are Robert Demachy, in France, Alfred 
Stieglitz and Edward Steichen (at the beginning of their work), Gertrude Käsebier, 
Clarence H. White and Frank Eugene, in the United States of America, Heinrich Kühn, in 
Austria, Theodor and Oskar Hofmeister, in Germany, José Ortiz-Echagüe, in Spain, 
Alexander Keighley in United Kingdom.  
The Purist branch counts a huge number of illustrious names in the field of modern 
international photography: Edward Weston, Paul Strand, Edward Steichen and Alfred 
Stieglitz (who are actually mentioned as pertaining also to the Pictorialist branch, before 
their declared intention to depart from it and adhere to the other “front”), Ansel Adams, 
Imogen Cunningham, Williard van Dyke, in the United States of America, Albert 
Renger-Patzsch, August Sander, Karl Blossfeldt, in Germany,  Francis Frith, Peter Henry 
Emerson, in Great Britain, Eugene Atget, in France. 
 
Definitions tangle 
In order to put these two movements into perspective, let’s start with an interesting 
definition proposed by John L. Ward4: “Pictorialism is based on the premise that a 
photograph can be evaluated using the same parameters that are used for evaluating any 
other type of image (for example, engravings, drawings and paintings); the Purist position 
is based on the premise that photography has a certain intrinsic nature and that the value 
of a photograph depends directly on the conformity to this nature. For the Pictorialist, 
photography is the mean, and art is the end; for the Purist, photography is the mean and 
the end at the same time, and the Purist is also reluctant when it comes about art.” If we 
stand back a little, we notice however that this definition says nothing about Purism. It is 
like saying that an eggplant is good if it is indeed an eggplant. (Well, letting apart the fact 
that this prejudice could be the practical grounding of the organic agriculture, although in 
this case we can also identify other reasons, that it is healthier etc.) But in the case of the                                                         4 Ward, L. John, The Criticism of Photography as Art , University Press of Florida, Gainesville, 
1978, as quoted in Joan Fontcuberta, Estética fotográfica, Introducción, p. 27, our translation. 
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Purism, if this is the only criterion to be applied, it’s pretty difficult to build on it a fertile 
theory, because it would seem really scant and insufficiently descriptive. On the basis of 
such a theory, Purist photographs cannot be appraised and are somehow infallible, 
preventing any further artistic approach. Cutting off any possibility of artistic evaluation, 
the Purism defines a comfortable frontier between photography and art, closing the circle 
around itself and rejecting the intention of being digested and rendered by the art world. 
If we take these two definitions, we can see that neither of them is truly useful. The 
criterion should be what photography manages to express, either it is or it is not art. And 
from this point of view, yes, photography can be judged using art standards. I mean that 
only because a photograph is “truly” a photograph is not a sufficient condition. We can of 
course talk about its necessity, but its sufficiency seems way out of discussion. Even 
more, there is a confusion in these two definitions presented together, because the first 
one could easily be taken for a general case, while the second may be a particular case. I 
mean the second definition says that photography must be evaluated by photography’s 
standards, but this only leads us to saying that painting should be evaluated by painting’s 
standards, sculpture should be evaluated by sculpture’s standards and so on, while the 
first definition could be a generalization that says that any type of image can be analyzed 
or evaluated using standards or criteria “that are used for evaluating any other type of 
image”. 
However, when it comes to talking about the proximity between photography and 
art – or more exactly painting – it may prove difficult to draw a definite line somewhere, 
since the Pictorial look, in the Purist’s definition, meant a totally different thing at the 
time when this critique was formulated. Everything depends on what art/painting means 
at a certain moment in time: “While the Pictorialist tendency survived for a long time 
among the group of some of its supporters, Stieglitz and his group managed to leave it 
behind them and impose the idea of a pure photography, free of manipulations, free also 
of the dominance of painting, at least in what concerns the elaborated technique, because 
the impact of cubism over the New York scenes, for example, is undeniable.”5 In this                                                         
5 Sougez, Marie-Loup, Historia de la fotografía, Ediciones Catedra, Madrid, 1981, our translation, p. 
193. 
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account, Marie-Loup Sougez is calling attention to the legendary Purist pictures of 
Stieglitz, among others, that are portraying the Big Apple and that are obviously inspired 
by the cubist style of the beginning of the century.  
                  
Photograph by Alfred Stieglitz and cubist painting by April Buckley – is there a slight resemblance 
between the two? 
Other theoreticians of the photographic domain are describing this schism between 
Pictorialism and Purism in terms of a reaction to the accuse that photography is not an 
art: “Photographers responded to criticism of this kind in two main ways: either they 
accepted that photography was something different from art and sought to discover what 
the intrinsic properties of the medium were; or they pointed out that photography was 
more than a mechanical form of image-making, that it could be worked on and contrived 
so as to produce pictures which in some ways resembled paintings. ‘Pictorial’ 
photography, from the 1850s onwards, sought to overcome the problems of photography 
by careful arrangement of all the elements of the composition and by reducing the 
signifiers of technological production within the photograph. […] In the other camp were 
those photographers who celebrated the qualities of straight photography6 and did not                                                         
6 An alternate name for pure photography, actually more widely used and preferred by the Purists. 
Funny enough, today this name also connotates a sexual orientation, the “orthodox” one or 
heterosexual, thus indicating, subversely, that the other option, the Pictorialist one, has something to 
do with an uncanny, un-straight orientation. 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want to treat the medium as a kind of monochrome painting. They were interested in 
photography’s ability to provide apparently accurate records of the visual world and tried 
to give their images the formal status and finish of paintings while concentrating their 
attention on its intrinsic qualities.”7  
Yet, this explanation does not make justice to the either one of these movements, 
since it ascribe the intention to “give the image the formal status and finish of paintings” 
also to the Purists, which is by no means accurate and is vigorously denied by most of 
them. Actually, this is exactly what they were avoiding to do and that which represented 
their creed – well, at least at a manifest level –  , beyond doubt in order to clarify their 
position and split from the Pictorialist attitude. In conveying this definition, maybe the 
author is trying to put more in Purists’ basket, but sometimes more is less. Denying the 
minimalist aim to the Purists, it would be like depriving them of their true nature and 
identity. 
The confusion can get even worse. While some are presenting the Pictorialists as 
saying that photography is art and the Purists as saying that it is something else, unique 
and distinct from art, as we’ve seen before, others are talking about Pictorialist 
photography as imitating art and about Purist photography as an art in itself! Peter Henry 
Emerson, one of the most notorious partisans and spokesperson for the Purists, ex-
physician converted in photographer, “reached the conclusion that photography was 
‘superior to etching, wood engraving and pencil drawing’, thanks to the precision with 
which is capturing the perspective, and that only painting was being ranked before it, 
since photography still lacked color and – so he thought – the ability to reproduce the 
exact tonal equivalences.”8 Emerson’s complete trust and confidence in the flawlessness 
of photography had been for him, at one moment, an enough good reason to certify that 
photography was an art, and still, some time later, after understanding that photographic 
technique was not quite perfect, he was disappointed and, again, this represented for him                                                         
7 Photography: A Critical Introduction, Routledge, 2006, third edition, edited by Liz Wells, p. 14-
15. 
8 Newhall, Beaumont, Historia de la fotografía, Editorial Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 2002, our 
translation, p. 141. 
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a reason good enough to declare, sad and miserable, that photography was not an art… 
after all. 
 
Suspicions 
So, apparently, what Purists are saying is that photography is all about spontaneity. 
Photographing means “snap”, snap, snap… snapshot, not all this premeditation 
concerning the context, the frame, the “framing”. And, as it seems, neither the post-
meditation of the processing, montaging, collage-ing etc. Purism versus Pictorialism is 
the war between spontaneity and deliberation, the war between the “decisive moment”9 
and the chosen moment, between carelessness and carefulness.  
But is this really what they are saying? Or is something deeper? Is this a 
“spontaneous” argument or not so spontaneous? The very nature of photography – a dual 
nature, involving two parts, human and technological, – invites one to make this 
interrogation and to express doubts when in front of “suspicious” verdicts, such as those 
proposed by the partisans of the so-called “straight” photography. This interrogation can 
be elaborated with different tools, certainly from a cultural perspective: semiotical, 
esthetical, anthropological, journalistical, artistical etc. 
However, the peculiar nature of photography makes it a particularly suitable subject 
for the psychoanalytical approach – the symbolic that lies within the photographic and 
that confers it all its force is at the same time a deposit of significances impossible to be 
ignored. The eye is a powerful organ, and it is the eye that is the main tool of the 
photographer. At a fantasmatic level, the eye can benefit of an important libidinal 
investment. Accordingly to the psychoanalytical theory, the libido, that is the “entire 
available energy of the Eros […] still undiscrimated”10 – or as Jung sees it, the “psychic 
energy” in general – represents the main energetic deposit of the individual. In the case of                                                         
9 Syntagma made famous by French photographer Henri Cartier-Bresson, well-known for his 
opportune documentary and journalistic photos. 
10 Freud, Sigmund, Obras completas, XXIII, Buenos Aires, 1989, p. 147, our translation. 
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a mature sexuality, the genital organs are the ones that are mainly designated as being 
sexually significant, but the libido can also be invested in external objects (“object-
libido”), sublimated toward symbolic objects or it can be directed toward any area of the 
body – Freud gives the example of the mouth, that becomes an erotogenic zone due to the 
suction process, during breast-feeding: “Thus we learn that infants perform actions which 
have no purpose other than obtaining pleasure. It is our belief that they first experience 
this pleasure in connection with taking nourishment, but that they soon learn to separate it 
from that accompanying condition. We can only refer this pleasure to an excitation of the 
areas of the mouth and lips; we call those parts of the body ‘erotogenic zones’ and 
describe the pleasure derived from sucking as a sexual one.”11 However, the versatility of 
the human body when it comes to erotogeneity12 seems astonishing, as analytical practice 
seems to confirm it: “As you probably know, the hysterical neurosis can produce its 
symptoms in any system of organs and so disturb any function. Analysis shows that in 
this way all the so-called perverse impulses which seek to replace the genital by some 
other organ manifest themselves: these organs are then behaving like substitutive 
genitals. The symptoms of hysteria have actually led us to the view that the bodily 
organs, besides the functional part they play, must be recognized as having a sexual  
(erotogenic) significance, and that the execution of the first of these tasks is disturbed if 
the second of them makes too many claims.13 […] We learn too to what a large extent the 
organs for the intake of nourishment and for excretion can in particular become the 
vehicles of sexual excitation.”14 
Obviously, in these discussion Freud is talking about the condition of psychological 
illness, but psychoanalysis stipulates – this being one of its greatest discoveries – that the 
difference between psychological health and illness is only a quantitative one, not one                                                         11 Freud, Sigmund, “General Theory of the Neuroses – The sexual life of human beings”, in The 
Pelican Freud Library, vol. 1, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, translated by James 
Strachey, Penguin Books, London, 1979, p. 355-356. 
12 The capacity of being or functioning as an erogenous zone. 
13 Here, Freud sends to a paper about the psychogenic disturbance of vision, dating from 1910 (!). 
14 Freud, Sigmund, Ibid., p. 350. 
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that refers to quality. That means that between the “normal” and the deviant, the 
difference is one of degree. The pathological libidinal charge directed onto an organ can 
function in a symbolic register for a sound person, the same amount of libidinal energy 
being “sublimated” in this case.  
“Other forms of the neurosis, the brooding kinds”, adds Freud at this point, 
“correspond to an excessive sexualization of actions which ordinarily have their place as 
preliminaries on the path to normal sexual satisfaction – an excessive sexualization of the 
wanting to look or to touch or to explore.”15 Well, it’s the eye that looks around, that 
watches through the camera lens, it’s the eye that is being cut apart in Buñuel’s film, the 
eye that continues obstinately to see and follow the main character in Becketts’s charade, 
the eye that sees and lets itself being seen. It’s the eternal polarization of the 
voyeurism/exhibitionism. 
The camera is also an eye, but a mechanical, cold eye. An eye that can be accepted 
as an instrument, as an assistant, one that can stir up fear and resentment, or one that can 
be idealized and idolatrized. Camera can give one a sense of empowerment, an illusion of 
seeing it all, of possessing “more” eye than the others, or it can also be a hiding, a mask, 
a stratagem that allows one to see without being seen. 16 
The third element that completes the image is the hand. It is well-known the fact 
that the neural image of the hand – the way we perceive our hands – occupies a sizeable                                                         
15 Freud, Sigmund, Ibid., p. 351, our emphasizing.  
16 A funny observation is that many photographers display on their personal page, in the 
contact/about area, a photo of themselves while holding a camera, most often covering one eye or 
even more than half of the face. This would be useless or redundant, because it is already of 
understanding for the visitors that the pictures presented on the page were obtained using a 
photocamera, and that they were made by the person stating him/herself as author. However, it is 
often a predilection of the artist to do so. One explanation could be that it is a manner of 
contextualising himself, of integrating and including his person as a nonexclusive entity of the 
photographic context of his webpage. It could also be a way of “merchandising” himself, or of 
erasing softly the frontiers between person and work, of immersing his identity into the universal 
context of “taking pictures”. But it can also be a way of empowering himself, of presenting his 
“persona” as being more than human: a sort of android that benefits of the advantages of the two 
worlds, the organic, human world, and the anorganic, mechanical world. And, not the least, a way of 
masking himself, of constructing a character, or even more, of fulfilling an infantile desire – that of 
seeing without being seen (e.g. A child says to his mother: “Mom, when I put this coat on, I become 
invisible…”). 
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area of the brain – right hand/left side of the brain, left hand/right side of the brain. This 
speaks fully about the importance of this part of the body, if only at a purely physical 
level. However, using the idea of one study accomplished in the year 1999 at McGill 
University, Montreal, Canada17, when it was discovered that a specific area of the brain 
became significantly enlarged for the taxi drivers in London, that being due to the fact 
that they had to learn all the names of the streets of London in order to pass the taxi 
driver’s exam, we can only imagine the “magnitude” of the hand’s image on the brain of 
the photographers, if we think of the countless number of times he/she has to push the 
shutter button.  
Freud makes a very interesting association between the intense activity of the hands 
and masturbation, while dedicating a study to Dostoievski’s personality. The idea comes 
from the alleged addiction with gambling, displayed by the writer. Gambling, that in the 
same time means “playing”, a term used in nursery to describe the masturbatory activity: 
“The ‘vice’ of masturbation is replaced by the addiction of gambling; and the emphasis 
laid upon the passionate activity of the hands betrays this derivation. Indeed, the passion 
for play is an equivalent of the old compulsion to masturbate; ‘playing’ is the actual word 
used in the nursery to describe the activity of the hands upon the genitals.”18 If this entire                                                         
17 “Structural MRIs of the brains of humans with extensive navigation experience, licensed London 
taxi drivers, were analyzed and compared with those of control subjects who did not drive taxis. The 
posterior hippocampi of taxi drivers were significantly larger relative to those of control subjects. A 
more anterior hippocampal region was larger in control subjects than in taxi drivers. Hippocampal 
volume correlated with the amount of time spent as a taxi driver (positively in the posterior and 
negatively in the anterior hippocampus). These data are in accordance with the idea that the posterior 
hippocampus stores a spatial representation of the environment and can expand regionally to 
accommodate elaboration of this representation in people with a high dependence on navigational 
skills. It seems that there is a capacity for local plastic change in the structure of the healthy adult 
human brain in response to environmental demands. […] Taxi drivers in London must undergo 
extensive training, learning how to navigate between thousands of places in the city. This training is 
colloquially known as “being on The Knowledge” and takes about 2 years to acquire on average. To 
be licensed to operate, it is necessary to pass a very stringent set of police examinations. London taxi 
drivers are therefore ideally suited for the study of spatial navigation. The use of a group of taxi 
drivers with a wide range of navigating experience permitted an examination of the direct effect of 
spatial experience on brain structure.” Navigation-related structural change in the hippocampi of 
taxi drivers, Communicated by Brenda Milner, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, November 10, 
1999. 
18 Freud, Sigmund, “Dostevsky and Parricide”, in The Pelican Freud Library, vol. 14, Art and 
Literature, translated by James Strachey, Penguin Books, London, 1986, p. 459. 
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manipulation of the camera and its buttons and controls – and the more sophisticated the 
camera is, the more controls it includes – can equal to a fantasmatic masturbation, then 
the pressing of the shutter can only equal to a climax of the entire act. We can only think 
of the success that Cartier-Bresson’s phrase, “the decisive moment”, encountered. Could 
it be that the satisfaction granted by pressing the shutter in the exact moment amounts to 
an orgasmic flash in the order of the symbolic? 
Of course, this is true for all the professions that involve an extensive use of the 
hand. Still, the simplicity of this gesture – as in “push the button” – turns this hand 
activity into a magic trick. The photographer’s hand is invested with symbolic capability, 
since it does not imply a “muscular” action, a strong treatment. It is not an investment 
based on quantity of effort, but on quantity of output. It is miraculous because with a 
minimal endeavor one obtains a maximum of results. Contrary to forging all day long to 
get a coin, you slightly press a sensitive button and get a full-picture.  
Actually, art has been many times paralleled with magic, and while nowadays this 
expression is used in a metaphorical sense, it wasn’t always like that: “People speak with 
justice of the ‘magic of art’ and compare artists to magicians. But the comparison is 
perhaps more significant than it claims to be. There can be no doubt that art did not begin 
as art for art’s sake. It worked originally in the service of impulses which are for the most 
part extinct today. And among them we may suspect the presence of many magical 
purposes.”19 Among these purposes can be listed the “evoking” or “conjuring” of the 
supernatural powers. Whether photography is or isn’t an art, that’s a different story, but if 
it will be decided that it is, it must be the most “magical” of them all: being so 
“instantaneous”, it allows an immediate and complete recovery of the sense and signifiers 
involved, acting like a narcissistic bandage for the psyche. 
 
                                                         
19 Freud, Sigmund, Totem and Taboo, “Animism, Magic, Omnipotence of Thoughts”, in The 
Standard Edition of The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XIII, translation by 
James Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud, London, The Hogarth Press, 1986, p. 90. 
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What’s wrong with the Purism 
But since photography in general seems to be so fitting for a semiotic and 
psychoanalytical investigation, since the dual nature and the surprising modus operandi 
are its true personality, why it would be that our suspicions manifest only in the direction 
of one manner of considering and practicing it, namely the Purism?  
First of all, it must be said that there is no intention here to make a comparison 
between the Purist photography and the Pictorialist one, that there is no aim to 
acknowledge the superiority – aesthetic, artistic, commercial etc. – of either one or to 
analyze the philosophical systems that represent their theoretical basis, as a platform for 
measurement and review.  
The suspicions were stirred up by the peculiar nature of the Purist argumentation: 
the views expressed by the supporters of the straight photography seems to include 
almost always a frenzied edge, an unnecessary ardor, a combative tone that may disclose 
that fact there’s something hidden there, lurking, something that does not serve the 
purpose of presenting an unbiased philosophical claim – well, as long as this ideal is 
humanly possible. In the following chapters, I would like to advance and argue for the 
hypothesis that underneath the Purist reasoning there is a strong narcissistic-type attitude 
and to clarify the features of this attitude. Also, it will be interesting to see in which way 
the unconscious component influences the practical results, but mostly to see how it is 
possible to build an entire “aesthetic” theory upon “sentimental”, psychological drives, 
merging admirably these motives with the texture and consistency of the rational 
assessment.  
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Two. Purist argumentation – unveiling the narcissistic structure of discourse 
About narcissism  
Before proceeding to a thorough analysis of the Purist discourse, it is useful to 
introduce the concept of narcissism, as it was depicted by the psychoanalytical theory. 
First of all, I must say that the idea of unconscious is central here. When Freud proposed 
this concept, he was aware of the antipathy with which it will be encountered: “The 
division of mental life into what is conscious and what is unconscious is the fundamental 
premise on which psycoanalisis is based; […] psychoanalyis cannot accept the view that 
consciousness is the essence of mental life, but is obliged to regard consciousnees as one 
property of mental life, which may coexist along with its other properties or may be 
absent. […] To most people who have had a philosophical education, the idea of anything 
mental which is not also conscious is so unconceivable that it seems to them absurd and 
refutable simply by logic.”20 From a more philosophical perspective, the philosopher 
Robyn Ferrell introduces this concept in an intent to use it for discussing the mind/body 
problem: “The unconscious is then that with which counsciousness struggles, all that 
which lies beyond itself, both mental and material.”21 
Well, the unconscious is the realm where unconscious or repressed ideas exist, 
ideas “which can produce in the mind all the effects that ordinary ideas do (including 
effects that can in their turn become conscious as ideas) without themselves becoming 
conscious.”22 Along this unconscious segment of the person, resides another segment, 
that one we are more familiar with: “[… ] in every individual there is a coherent 
organization of mental processes, which we call his ego…. From this ego proceed the 
repressions, too, by means of which an attempt is made to cut off certain trends in the                                                         
20 Freud, Sigmund, The Major Works of Sigmund Freud, Encyclopaedia Britanica, Inc. 1952, 
William Benton, Publisher, The Ego and the Id (1923), translation by Joan Riviere, p.697. 
21 Ferrell, Robyn, Passion in Theory. Conceptions of Freud and Lacan, Routledge, 1996, London & 
New York, p. 2. 
22 Freud, Sigmund, The Major Works of Sigmund Freud, Encyclopaedia Britanica, Inc. 1952, 
William Benton, Publisher, The Ego and the Id (1923), translation by Joan Riviere, p.698. 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mind not merely from consciousness but also from their other forms of manifestation and 
activity.”23  
Narcisissm can be seen, in part, as a modality through which the individual tries to 
preserve and construct his self, and also as a smart evolutive solution for the human being 
to cope with precariousness of life: “An object which was lost has been reinstated within 
the ego; that is, that an object-cathexis24 has been replaced by an identification. […] 
Since then we have come to understand that this kind of substitution has a great share in 
determining the form taken on by the ego and that it contributes materially toward 
building up what is called a character.[…] The ego, which at its inception is far from 
being robust, becomes aware of the object-cathexes, and either acquiesces in them or tries 
to defend itself against them by the process of repression. […] When it happens that a 
person has to give up a sexual object, there quite often ensues a modification in his ego 
which can only be described as a reinstatement of the object within the ego […] We must 
also take into consideration the case of simultaneous object-cathexis and identification, 
i.e., in which the alteration in character occurs before the object has been given up. In 
such a case, the alteration in character wold be able to survive the object-relation and, in a 
certain sense, to conserve it. […] From another point of view it may be said that this 
transformation of an erotic object-choice into a modification of the ego is also a method 
by which the ego can obtain control over the id25 and deepen its relation with it – at the 
cost, it is true, of acquiescing to a large extent in the id´s experiences. When the ego 
assumes the features of the object, it forces itself, so to speak, upon the id as a love-object 
and tries to make good the loss of that object by saying, ‘Look, I am so like the object, 
you can as well love me.’ The transformation of object-libido into narcissistic libido 
                                                        23 Freud, Sigmund, Ibid., p.699. 24 Cathexis is the libidinal charge and also the term chosen by James Strachey, the oficial translator 
of Freud’s work, for the original german Besetzung. It derives from the greek word kathexis, that 
means “to hold fast”.  
25 The translation proposed by James Strachey for “das Es”. The Freudian unconsciouss. 
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which thus takes place obviously implies an abandonment of sexual aims, a process of 
desexualization; it is consequently a kind of sublimation.”26 
Sublimation, actually, is the basis of any cultural act and of every “superior” 
expression of the spirit. But sublimation means renunciation from the part of the id and of 
the ego also, and all this for the sake of pleasing the super-ego, one of the most important 
instance of the individual, the “civilizing” and progressive instance, that puts a lot of 
pressure over the other two instances. Super-ego is synonymous to unhapiness for the 
humans, but also with evolution, enlightenment and, not least… art. Maybe it’s not a 
surprise that what’s considered to be most elevated, namely art, has its roots into that 
which is the most primitive: “The sexual instinct is particularly well fitted to make 
contributions of this kind since it is endowed with a capacity for sublimation: that is, it 
has the power to replace its immediate aim by other aims which may be valued more 
highly and which are not sexual.”27 It is a bit like the precious truffles, that grow in the 
dirt… 
The libidinal energy, however, has to respect a very special dynamic of the 
psychological functioning, avoiding clustering and blockage: “this displaceable libido is 
employed in the service of the pleasure-principle to obviate accumulations and to 
facilitate discharge.”28 Not all of it can be sublimated, neither all of it can be put in the 
service of the pleasure principle. It has a different destiny, regarding the evolution phase 
in which the individual places himself. In this sense, Freud talks about primary 
narcisissm and secondary narcisissm. Primary narcisissm is the initial phase, that takes 
place in the early childhood, when the child invests the entire available libido upon 
himself. The secondary narcisissm means a return of the libido to the ego, libido that was                                                         26 Freud, Sigmund, The Major Works of Sigmund Freud, Encyclopaedia Britanica, Inc. 1952, 
William Benton, Publisher, The Ego and the Id (1923), translation by Joan Riviere, p.703-704. 27 Freud, Sigmund, “Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood”, in The Pelican Freud 
Library, vol. 14,  Art and Literature, translated by James Strachey, Penguin Books, London, 1986, p. 
167. 28 Freud, Sigmund, The Major Works of Sigmund Freud, Encyclopaedia Britanica, Inc. 1952, 
William Benton, Publisher, The Ego and the Id (1923), translation by Joan Riviere, p.710. 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in an intermediate phase invested in objects, by the means of the object-cathexes: “At the 
very beginning, all the libido is accumulated in the id, while the ego is still in process of 
formation or far from robust. Part of this libido is sent out by the id into erotic object-
cathexes, whereupon the ego, now growing stronger, attemps to obtain possession of this 
object-libido and to force itself upon the id as a love-object. The narcissism of the ego is 
thus seen to be secondary, acquired by the withdrawal of the libido from objects.“29 
At childhood or in the case of severe neurosis, narcissism has definite 
characteristics: “an overestimation of the power of wishes and mental processes, the 
omnipotence of thoughts, a belief in the magical virtue of words, and a method of dealing 
with the outer world – the art of magic – which appears to be a logical application of 
these grandiose premises.”30 But when and why, Freud asks himself, does the self realize 
the need to go from this narcissistic phase to the next phase, sending its ego-libido 
towards exterior objects, as he would practically send his “love” away: “[…] whence does 
that necessity arise that urges our mental life to pass on beyond the limits of narcissism 
and to attach the libido to objects? The answer which would follow from our line of 
thought would once more be that we are so impelled when the cathexis of the ego with 
libido exceeds a certain degree. A strong egoism is a protection against disease, but, in 
the last resort, we must begin to love in order that we may not fall ill, and must fall ill if, 
in consequence of frustration, we cannot love.”31 Actually, he does say that love must be 
the most selfless way of the ego to attach all his libido to an “object”: “The highest form 
                                                        29 Freud, Sigmund, The Major Works of Sigmund Freud, Encyclopaedia Britanica, Inc. 1952, 
William Benton, Publisher, The Ego and the Id (1923), translation by Joan Riviere, p.711. 30 Freud, Sigmund, The Major Works of Sigmund Freud, Encyclopaedia Britanica, Inc. 1952, 
William Benton, Publisher, On Narcissism: an Introduction (1914), translation by Cecil M. Baines, 
p.400. 31 Freud, Sigmund, The Major Works of Sigmund Freud, Encyclopaedia Britanica, Inc. 1952, 
William Benton, Publisher, On Narcissism: an Introduction (1914), translation by Cecil M. Baines, 
p. 404. 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of development of which object-libido is capable is seen in the state of being in love, 
when the subject seems to yield up his whole personality in favor of object-cathexis”.32 
Unfortunately, this delegation and withdrawal of the libido to and from the objects, 
flowing to and from the ego, can experience certain hurdles and deviations, because 
sometimes the ego may choose, instead of the real objects, imaginary objects, simply 
because there is an urgent need for an energetic discharge: “The ‘working-over’ of 
stimuli in the mind accomplishes wonders for the internal discharge of excitations which 
are incapable of direct discharge outwards, or for which such a discharge is, for the 
moment, undesirable. Now it is in the first instance a matter of indiference whether the 
objects of this internal process of ‘working-over’ are real or imaginary. The difference 
does not appear till later, when the turning of the libido towards unreal objects 
(introversion) has led to a damming-up. The megalomania of the paraphrenics permits a 
similar internal working-over of the libido which has returned to the ego to be made; 
perhaps it is only when this process fails that the damming-up of the libido in the ego 
becomes pathogenic […]”33 
There are though healthy and valuable ways to get advantage of this secondary 
narcissism without letting it become pathogenic, and these are through the way of the 
ego-ideal. Following the constitution of the super-ego, the ego builds an ego-ideal, a 
construct that is essencial to the understanding of narcisissm. This very construct permits 
to the individual not to give up his/her ideal image about him/herself, that he himself 
fostered as a child. Faced with the harsh expectancies and demands of the super-ego and 
of the external reality, the ego projects in front of himself this salvation structure, that 
allows him to maintain his good opinion about him: “We may say that the one man has 
set up an ideal in himself by which he measures his actual ego […] To this ideal ego is 
                                                        32 Freud, Sigmund, The Major Works of Sigmund Freud, Encyclopaedia Britanica, Inc. 1952, 
William Benton, Publisher, On Narcissism: an Introduction (1914), translation by Cecil M. Baines, 
p. 400. 33 Freud, Sigmund, The Major Works of Sigmund Freud, Encyclopaedia Britanica, Inc. 1952, 
William Benton, Publisher, On Narcissism: an Introduction (1914), translation by Cecil M. Baines, 
p. 404. 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now directed the self-love which the real ego enjoyed in childhood. The narcissism seems 
to be now displaced on to this new ideal ego, which, like the infantile ego, deems itself 
the possessor of all perfections. As always where the libido is concerned, here again man 
has shown himself incapable of giving up a gratification he has once enjoyed. He is not 
willing to forgo his narcissistic perfection in his childhood […] He seeks to recover the 
early perfection  [...] in the new form of an ego-ideal. That which he projects ahead of 
him as his ideal is merely his substitute for his lost narcissism of his childhood – the time 
when he was his own ideal.”34 
But let’s not be fouled, this is still narcissism, still the refusal to give up the high 
opinion one holds about oneself. Just that it is presented in a different wrapping, safe 
from the pathological, but still immature somehow, still reluctant to sacrifice the 
wholeness of the “perfect being”. 
 
Picture-perfect 
And now we can proceed to a careful deconstruction of the Purist discourse, to 
appraise its tone and mood.  
The most striking reaction that draws our attention is the conversion-reconversion 
of one of the most important members of the Purist faction, Peter Henry Emerson. A 
former physician, interested in Helmholtz’s optical theories, Emerson immersed himself 
in the study of the photographic technique, trying to exploit its possibilities at its best and 
to go as far as possible from the Pictorialism, with “its artificiality”. Taking advantage of 
a moment of resignation among the Pictorialists, he makes an impressive conference at 
Camera Club in London (1886), criticizing harshly the Pictorialist style and proposing a 
return to nature as source of inspiration. He is the one, actually, that coined the term of 
“straight photography”. He was feeling that the Pictorialists were just imitating painting                                                         34 Freud, Sigmund, The Major Works of Sigmund Freud, Encyclopaedia Britanica, Inc. 1952, 
William Benton, Publisher, On Narcissism: an Introduction (1914), translation by Cecil M. Baines, 
p. 407. 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and were failing to understand the fact that photography is a art of its own: “The 
photographic technique is perfect, and these botches are useless.”35 
However, despite the fact that he managed to arouse the interest of his colleagues, 
he will change his opinion later, ending in big disappointment. Why? Because one 
painter-friend, apparently Whistler, lectured him about photography and painting, 
convincing him that painting is superior to the former. So, since photography proves not 
to be “the fairest of them all”, he would rather quit: “In January 1891, Emerson resigned 
bravely and dramatically to what he had been promoted with such passion. He declared 
that a ‘great painter’ – which he doesn’t name, but who seems to have been James 
McNeil Whistler – had demonstrated him the fallacy of misunderstanding art for nature, 
and he added that the scientific research, recently published, realized by Ferdinand Hurter 
and Vero Charles Driffield, in what concerns the photographic process, convinced him 
that the control of the tonal relations, during developing, was much more rigid than he 
had thought. Disheartened, Emerson concluded that photography was not an art.”36 
The announcement he makes after that comes literally like a mourning: The Death 
of Naturalistic Photography, the brochure with black covers published by him, in which 
he acknowledges, humiliated, that there are so many limitations in photography, that pure 
photography is actually impossible. Therefore, “impure photography is only a confession 
of limitations…”37  
Emerson’s reaction is so similar to a child’s reaction when he loses something. 
Suddenly, that something is diminished and lessened within a symbolic discourse, as if to 
make the loss more tolerable. It is like before, he was allowed to believe that photography                                                         
35 Emerson, Peter Henry, Naturalistic Photography for the Students of the Arts, Sampson Low, 
Marston, Searle and Livington, London, 1889, quoted by Beaumont Newhall in Historia de la 
fotografía, Editorial Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 2002, our translation, p. 142. 36 Newhall, Beaumont, Historia de la fotografía, Editorial Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 2002, our 
translation, p. 143. 37 Emerson, Peter Henry, The Death of Naturalistic Photography, private edition, 1890, quoted by 
Beaumont Newhall in Historia de la fotografía, Editorial Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 2002, our 
translation, p. 145. 
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was “perfect” and this awareness was enough to sustain his ego’s necessity to believe in 
something as flawless as himself – we already know that a child’s primary narcissism lets 
him think so about himself – , but as soon as this belief was shuttered, he woke up in 
complete and terrible disenchant. Judging upon his reaction, we can say that the object-
cathexis wasn’t able to find a very good and fruitful new path, that it couldn’t be 
reassigned with ease to another new external or imaginary object, nor could it return to 
the ego. This “over-estimation” – the thought that photography, for instance, is perfect – 
is a “sure indication of a narcissistic feature in object-choice which we have already 
appreciated”38. A more mature approach to photography would have permited Emerson 
to continue being enchanted by this art/technique, even after dicovering that it is not 
perfect, just as it happens when we go from childhood to adulthood and we have to 
continue living, working, loving, even if we know that everything is not so perfect and 
dream-like as we thought when we were infants. Maybe it is that exactly the limitations 
that Emerson is talking about are the ones that should’ve constituted an impulse toward 
progress, not a reason for discontent. 
Nevertheless, Emerson’s statement is not an exception. Francis Frith, for example, 
another theoretician of the Purism, was stating in his essay The Art of Photography, that 
“the photographic technique is perfect and does not need this kind of cheap tricks”39 – 
this was being said in regard to the Pictorialist habit of post processing the pictures. This 
all-pervading quest for perfection and in the same time pretense of detaining it is, again, 
so similar to the child’s primary narcissism, a time when he considered himself self-
sufficient. Because in fact what is so obvious at Purists is their identification with the 
photographic40 – this is in fact the reason why they are so sensitive about it. They fell in 
                                                        38 Freud, Sigmund, The Major Works of Sigmund Freud, Encyclopaedia Britanica, Inc. 1952, 
William Benton, Publisher, On Narcissism: an Introduction (1914), translation by Cecil M. Baines, 
p. 406. 
39 Published in The Art Journal, 1st of March, 1859, London, quoted in Joan Fontcuberta (ed.), 
Estética fotográfica, Introducción, p. 29, our translation. 
40 The “photographical” is used here in an all-encompassing sense, including the technique, the 
results, the art of it, its symbolic understanting, its practice and all else that can contribute to its 
meaning. 
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love with it and identified with it, introjecting this external object as a sure manner of 
preserving its object-cathexis: “We must also take into consideration the case of 
simultaneous object-cathexis and identification, i.e. , in which the alteration in character 
occurs before the object has been given up. In such a case, the alteration in character 
wold be able to survive the object-relation and, in a certain sense, to conserve it.” This 
allows them not only to secure its preservation, but to secure the self-love: “When the ego 
assumes the features of the object, it forces itself, so to speak, upon the id as a love-object 
and tries to make good the loss of that object by saying, ‘Look, I am so like the object, 
you can as well love me.’”41 Since they are imperceptibly “assuming the features” of the 
photographical, it is easy to understand the fervor of their reaction to the Pictorialist 
intentions of postprocessing, altering, modifying, adding, simplifying, combining etc. 
These intentions equal to two things: one. An assumption accordingly to which the 
photographical – meaning them – are not perfect and need improvement; and two. A 
narcissistic wound, caused by the alteration of their identity and by denegation of their 
supremacy. 
 
Nature rules 
We shall see that most of the Purists venerate nature. For them, it is not nature, 
actually, but Nature! Together with the veneration of the photographic medium – the 
photographic nature – this is one of their main traits. Maybe the most famous modern 
American photographer, Edward Weston was one of the first apologists of Nature as 
invulnerable and majestic “Being”, a Being that is above all human petty concerns. When 
photographing Nature, Weston believes, one must shake up any personal surcharges and 
any artistic-expressive intention: “I’m not interested anymore in trying to ‘express 
myself’, in imposing my own personality upon nature; without prejudices, without 
falsification, I want to identify myself with nature […] Therefore, what I register is not an 
                                                        41 Freud, Sigmund, The Major Works of Sigmund Freud, Encyclopaedia Britanica, Inc. 1952, 
William Benton, Publisher, The Ego and the Id (1923), translation by Joan Riviere, p.704. 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interpretation, is not my idea about what nature should be, but a revelation: an absolute 
and impersonal recognition of the meaning of things.”42 
The passion for nature animates also other well-known Purists of the time, such as 
Ansel Adams, Imogen Cunningham, Paul Strand, Edward Steichen, reaching an almost 
“mystical attitude”43, as Joan Fontcuberta puts it. Ansel Adams’ memorable American 
landscapes all have a Kantian sublime tinge attached to them, and photography historicist 
Beaumont Newhall observes about one of his images, in particular, Mount Williamson – 
Clearing Storm, that “it is an epic work, pristine, truly cosmogonic”44. 
               
Edward Weston                                                    Ansel Adams 
In a certain manner of speaking, the approach is contrary to that one common to the 
landscape art, when nature is actually “used” as prime material for the work of art, or can 
even be “abused”, metaphorically speaking: “Contemporary earth works and 
environmental art sometimes appear to be in conflict with nature”45.  
                                                        
42 Weston, Edward, My Camera on Point Lobos, Da Capo Press, Nueva York, 1950, our translation, 
quoted in Joan Fontcuberta (ed.), Estética fotográfica, Introducción, p. 35-36. 43 Joan Fontcuberta (ed.), Estética fotográfica, Editorial Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 2003, 
Introducción, p. 35-36. 44 Newhall, Beaumont, Historia de la fotografía, Editorial Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 2002, our 
translation, p. 192. 
45 Donald W. Crawford, “The Aesthetics of Nature and the Environment”, in Blackwell Guide to 
Aesthetics, Peter Kivy (ed.), Blackwell Publishing, 2004, p. 308. 
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But the most striking approach to nature is that of the German group of 
photographers self-titled Neue Sachlichkeit (The New Objectivity), among which were 
names like Karl Blossfeldt, Ernst Fuhrmann, Helmut Gersheim, Albert Renger-Patzsch. 
These photographers practiced a very literal and factual photographic style, practically 
dissecting the real around in the search of a crude visual truth. Albert Renger-Patzsch 
published in 1928 a book with the name Die Welt is Schön (The World is beautiful), 
including photos with all kind of images taken from nature: “The images were presenting 
all types of objects in foreground that were showing the most insignificant details; the 
accent was upon the morphology, flat light, static framing often frontally shot.”46 
   
Imogen Cunningham               Albert Renger-Patzsch          Karl Blossfeldt 
This peculiar aproach to nature – Nature, as we were implying before – uncover the 
uncanny sort of relation to it: a very primitive type of relation, an idolatric relation, that 
reminds us of animism, the doctrine accordingly to which one ascribe soul – or spirit – to 
inanimate objects and things. Animism is common among the primitive tribes and it is 
thought to be an incipient and crucial stage in the evolution of the human thought: “What 
led to the introduction of these terms was a realization of the highly remarkable view of 
nature and the universe adopted by the primitive races of whom we have knowledge, 
whether in past history or at the present time. They people the world with innumerable 
                                                        
 
46 Fontcuberta, Joan, Fotografía: Conceptos y procedimientos, una propuesta metodológica, 
Editorial Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 1990, p. 168. 
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spiritual beings both benevolent and malignant; and these spirits and demons they regard 
as the causes of natural phenomena and they believe that not only animals and plants but 
all the inanimate objects in the world are animated by them.”47 Freud is perceiving this 
construction – “this first human Weltanschauung“48 – as responding to the necessity of 
understanding and controlling the world around, and also credits this approach as a first 
“psychological theory”.  
Relying on anthropological studies (Spencer, Frazer, Tyler, Wundt) and also 
philosophical theories (Schelling, Hume49), Freud builds a very coherent theory of its 
own, within which animism constitutes an initial phase, followed by the religious 
understanding and culminating with the scientific one. Though, these three macro-stages 
are paralleled by three micro-stages in the evolution of the individual, and animism is 
corresponding to the narcissism, that time when the human – the child, in fact, in the case 
of the primary narcissism – ascribe spirit to things in order to control them, when the 
“omnipotence of thoughts” and the “overvaluation” are the rules. How did Freud noticed 
this similarity? Comparing the accounts given by the anthropologists with the accounts 
offered by his patients. He quotes Frazer on saying that “Men mistook the order of their 
ideas for the order of nature, and hence imagined that the control which they have, or 
seem to have, over their thoughts, permitted them to exercise a corresponding control 
over things.”50 Then, what primitive humans were doing was attempting “to replace the 
laws of nature by psychological ones”51, and this is also what the infant is doing, not                                                         47 Freud, Sigmund, Totem and Taboo, “Animism, Magic, Omnipotence of Thoughts”, in The 
Standard Edition of The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XIII, translation by 
James Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud, London, The Hogarth Press, 1986, p. 76. 48 Freud, Sigmund, Ibid., p. 77. 
49 “There is an universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves, and to 
transfer to every object those qualities with which they are familiarly acquainted, and of which they 
are intimately conscious.” – David Hume, Natural History of Religion, section III, quoted by Freud 
in Totem and Taboo, “Animism, Magic, Omnipotence of Thoughts”, in The Standard Edition of The 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XIII, translation by James Strachey in 
collaboration with Anna Freud, London, The Hogarth Press, 1986, p. 77. 50 Freud, Sigmund, Ibid., p. 83. 51 Freud, Sigmund, Ibid., p. 83. 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knowing any better. The same “omnipotence of thoughts” is what Freud encountered at 
many of his neurotic patients: “It is in obsessional neuroses that the survival of the 
omnipotence of thoughts is most clearly visible and that the consequences of this 
primitive mode of thinking come closest to consciousness.”52 
But do things change dramatically in the era of the scientific understanding? “At the 
animistic stage men ascribe omnipotence to themselves. At the religious stage they 
transfer it to the gods but do not seriously abandon it themselves, for they reserve the 
power of influencing the gods in a variety of ways according to their wishes. The 
scientific view of the universe no longer affords any room for human omnipotence; men 
have acknowledged their smallness and submitted resignedly to death and to the other 
necessities of nature. None of the less the primitive belief in omnipotence still survives in 
men’s faith in the power of the human mind, which grapples with the laws of reality.”53 
Apparently, man never resign and never accepts its condition – at least as long as he 
cannot escape the appeal of the narcissism: “Primitive men and neurotics, as we have 
seen, attach a high valuation – in our eyes an over-valuation – to psychical acts. This 
attitude may plausibly be brought into relation with narcissism and regarded as an 
essential component of it.”54 
So, if the Purist is identifying himself with nature, as Weston was declaring55, what 
are the implications of this event? If nature’s laws are his thoughts, he is under the 
indictment of the magical thinking, because magic is “the technique of the animistic 
mode of thinking”56, as well as it characterizes the neurotic thinking. And “one of the                                                         52 Freud, Sigmund, Ibid., p. 86. 53 Freud, Sigmund, Ibid., p. 88. 54 Freud, Sigmund, Ibid., p. 89. 
55 “In the discipline of camera-technique, the artist can become identified with the whole of life and 
so realize a more complete expression”, from “Edward Weston on Photography”, in Peter C. 
Bunnell, Inside the Photograph. Writing on Twentieth-Century Photography, Aperture Foundation, 
New York, 2006, p. 70. 56 Freud, Sigmund, Ibid., p. 85. 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most widespread magical procedures for injuring an enemy is by making an effigy of him 
from any convenient material. […] Whatever is then done to the effigy, the same thing 
happens to the detested original. […] The same magical technique may be employed, not 
only for purposes of private enmity, but also for pious ends and for giving help to gods 
against malignant demons.”57 So, there are two different, nonetheless correlative 
psychological processes at stake here. First one, if the photography is the “effigy” of the 
nature, and there is an identification with nature at an unconscious level, then processing 
it, altering it – the standard Purist taboo – would equal to an alteration inflicted upon the 
self. This is unacceptable, is a terrible threat for the Narcissus. Secondly, if producing this 
effigy – the photography – can serve “pious ends”, then it is imperious that the whole 
ritual be as… pure as possible. A pure and unaltered image-effigy of nature, along with 
some adorning words – i.e., the famous book Ansel Adams published, that featured 
wonderful landscapes, completed by Whitman’s poems, or Paul Strand’s book with New 
England pictures, accompanied by texts – can function as a spell, as a narcissistic 
restoration.  
But whenever there is a taboo - and one so strongly expressed and continuously 
repeated as the Purist taboo concerning interventions upon the photographic image – 
must exist also a strong desire to do exactly what the taboo prohibits: “The prohibition 
owes its strength and its obsessive character precisely to its unconscious opponent, the 
concealed and undiminished desire – that is to say, to an internal necessity inaccessible to 
conscious inspection.”58 So, when the Purist photographer is insisting upon the fact that 
you cannot alter the photograph, because any photograph that “shows a certain 
manipulation or that elude the reality in that which concerns the election of the theme, 
                                                        57 Freud, Sigmund, Ibid., p. 79. 58 Freud, Sigmund, Totem and Taboo, “Taboo and Emotional Ambivalence”, in The Standard 
Edition of The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XIII, translation by James 
Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud, London, The Hogarth Press, 1986, p. 31. 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will be considered impure”59, could it be that what he really wants is exactly the opposite, 
that is “to alter the whole face of the earth in order to satisfy his wishes”60? 
Therefore, the solution, in order to maintain the taboo, is to treat Nature as an 
immeasurable totem, a totem that deserves the highest veneration and respect. The 
attitude is not that primitive as the one that forbids taking pictures, in some ancient 
cultures, because of the superstition that in this way one could rob the soul of the being 
photographed – robbing its nature, literally – but it is somehow spiritualized, elevated: 
you can take pictures if you manifest the most sanctimonious and devout conduct towards 
the photographed portion of nature. That means adoration and indictment to touch or re-
touch it… 
 
Truth or dare? 
Truth is invoked in Purists’ arguments in two different situations: as final objective 
of the photographic endeavor – “photography is my passion, the search for truth my 
obsession”61 – that implying, of course, that it is essentially possible to find the truth out 
there by photographic means; and as aesthetic category, stating that truth is beauty, as a 
parallel but not symmetric position with the more familiar aesthetic/scientific 
pronouncement that beauty is truth.  
The first situation is sending us toward a psychological appraisal of the Purist view 
over the humane capabilities – an ambitious view, no doubt about it, but this we already 
expected (sic!). In the light of this view, there are two crucial details to be taken into 
account: the fact that nothing-but-the-truth must be pursued and the fact that the truth                                                         
59 Newhall, Beaumont, Historia de la fotografía, Editorial Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 2002, our 
translation, p. 192. 60 Freud, Sigmund, Totem and Taboo, “Animism, Magic, Omnipotence of Thoughts”, in The 
Standard Edition of The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XIII, translation by 
James Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud, London, The Hogarth Press, 1986, p. 84. 
61 Alfred Stieglitz, quoted in Joan Fontcuberta (ed.), Estética fotográfica, Editorial Gustavo Gili, 
Barcelona, 2003, Introducción, p. 33. 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exist out there and can be encountered by the photographer. A follow-up question could 
be obviously if truth pre-exists out there or must/may be constructed, and if its 
finding/construction depends upon the photographer’s craft. 
This conviction regarding the ability to grasp the truth and deliver it on 
photographic paper is imparted by Purists’ aficionados, also. It is like a common universe 
of discourse that carry on along time. Talking about Atget’s pictures, for example, one 
critic says: “In Atget’s hands, the new procedure was showing the things as they appear, 
not as they seem, revealing in this way the epiphany of the real in all its bleakness”62. It is 
a daring thing to say, indeed, and not very much different than saying that it was showing 
things “as they are”. It is correct that this was always one of the alibis of photography, 
this ability to disclose, to reveal, to be “candid”. However, this candidness is not to be 
taken for granted, and the existence of an author, of a subject, makes it impossible for the 
photography to be viewed as objective, as for any other thing that involves the 
intervention of a third part. It is an interpretation and it will always be an interpretation. 
The problem, of course, surges when you want it to be more than that: “To photograph a 
rock, have it look like a rock, but be more than a rock. Significant representation – not 
interpretation.”63  
Cartier-Bresson’s “decisive moment” pictures represent the exact amount of reality 
that he wanted to convey, and the subjectivity of each one’s objectivity is unquestionable. 
Yet, the label of subjectivity is a reductive label for a prospect so magnanimous such as 
the Purist prospect. Nothing less than the truth, nothing less than the full objectivity must 
be the aim. One of the finest Purist photographer, Paul Strand, is making this 
fascinatingly oxymoronic proclamation: “The author must use and control the objectivity 
by means of photography”64. This looks more like constructing a truth than honestly                                                         
62 Coronado e Hijón, Diego, Una mirada a cámara: teorías de la fotografía, de Charles Baudelaire 
a Roland Barthes, Ediciones Alfar, Sevilla, 2005, our translation, p. 98. 
63 Edward Weston, quoted in “Edward Weston on Photography”, in Peter C. Bunnell, Inside the 
Photograph. Writing on Twentieth-Century Photography, Aperture Foundation, New York, 2006, p. 
70. 
64 Paul Strand, “The artistic motivation in photography”, in Joan Fontcuberta (ed.), Estética 
fotográfica, Editorial Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 2003, Introducción, p. 109. 
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looking for it – so much for straight photography… – , and this is an obvious 
overestimation and over-valuation typical for the narcissism – and actually in this case it 
is two-folded: on one hand, they assume the right to “control the objectivity”, on the other 
hand, they’re not really looking for the truth, but “they are plainly seeking themselves as 
a love-object and their type of object-choice may be termed narcissistic”65. 
The second situation is of a more ethical-aesthetical constitution, at least at first 
impression. It directs us as well toward contemporary debates about the beauty of truth, 
or the beauty of mathematics, on grounds such as symmetry, simplicity and coherence.  
But first of all, why would truth matter that much if we’re talking, supposedly, 
about art? “What is distinctive about art as a form of knowledge is that it is not a body of 
abstract truths derived by generalization or deduction from sets of relations; nor is it a 
simple item present to the senses in purely material terms. Rather it is a function of the 
zone of imagery—of world-projection—where abstract thought itself emerges from a 
mode of more corporeal and sensuous mimetic reference.”66 One simplist reasoning could 
be that if these photographers validate the pretense that they are portraying the truth in 
their straight and pure photographs, that is a sufficient condition for achieving the status 
of beauty. But even this is complicated, depending upon the theory of truth taken into 
account – if truth is considered to be the correspondence to reality, that’s the closest it can 
get. However, at Purists’ time, photography was available only in black and white, so 
neither the correspondence to reality wasn’t perfect, in the absolute sense of the 
understanding of the expression “correspondence”. 
There is also an ethical consequence here, meant in fact as a presumption – truth 
connotates truthfulness, honesty and, of course, straightforwardness. Just like its name 
says it, straight photography… On the other hand, it is accurate to say that this style of 
practicing the photography lead to the configuracion of new ethical values: “Photography                                                         65 Freud, Sigmund, The Major Works of Sigmund Freud, Encyclopaedia Britanica, Inc. 1952, 
William Benton, Publisher, On Narcissism: an Introduction (1914), translation by Cecil M. Baines, 
p. 405. 
66 Crowther, Paul, Defining Art, Creating the Canon, Artistic Value in an Era of Doubt, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 65. 
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not only imposed a certain aesthetic to the world view, but also contributed to the 
configuration of new ethical categories, such as precision and objectivity.”67 
The reverse side is beauty as truth. This is a successful idea in contemporary history 
of science. Ian Stewart, professor of mathematics at University of Warwick and a prolific 
writer on this theme, puts the things in an unexpected perspective, after exposing a 
mathematical argument: “Beauty is truth, truth beauty. The Pythagoreans and Platonists 
would have loved this evidence of the pivotal role of the mathematical patterns in the 
structure of our world. The octonions have a haunting, surreal mathematical beauty, 
which Dirac would have seized upon as a reason why 10-dimensional string theory has to 
be true. Or, if unhappily proved false, is nevertheless more interesting than whatever is 
true. But we have learned that beautiful theories need not be true, and until the verdict on 
superstrings is in, this possibility must remain pure conjecture.”68 Is it possible that the 
entire Purist theoretization be just a beautiful theory, that aspired to be also true? In this 
case, we would be talking about what it’s called, in psychoanalysis, rationalization, 
namely a procedure by the means of which the subject tries to give a coherent explanation 
– from a logical point of view – or morally acceptable, for an attitude, action, idea, 
feeling etc., for which the real reasons are not accesible to him69.  
In the same time, the zone system conceived by Ansel Adams, for example, bears a 
quaint resemblance to the precise and thorough beauty of the mathematical theories that 
Stewart is talking about, which makes us wonder if it is not an attempt to explain the 
world in the same way, in terms of “monads”, and based on the principle that truth is 
beauty/beauty is truth: “In 1941, the photographer [Adams, our account] elaborated his 
‘zone system’, a method for the calculation the exposure time and developing time, that 
                                                        67 Joan Fontcuberta, Prólogo, in Joan Fontcuberta (ed.), Estética fotográfica, Editorial Gustavo Gili, 
Barcelona, 2003, Introducción, p. 9. 
68 Stewart, Ian, Why Beauty is Truth. A History of Symmetry, Basic Books, Cambridge, MA, 2007, p. 
263. 
69 http://www.srdp.ro/ 
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was supposed to produce an optimal gradation of the grey tones.”70 A complementary 
comment comes from Weston, practically articulating the other half of the argument, 
accordingly to which “stealing beauty” means stealing truth, while beauty comes from the 
monadic-like complex universe of the photographic image: “The image that is thus 
swiftly recorded possesses certain qualities that at once distinguish it as photographic. 
First there is the amazing precision of definition, especially in the recording of fine detail; 
and second there is the unbroken sequence of infinetely subtle gradations from black to 
white. […] The photographic image partakes more of the nature of a mosaic than of a 
drawing or painting. It contains no lines in the painter’s sense, but is entirely made up of 
tiny particles. The extreme fineness of these particles gives a special tension to the image, 
and when that tension is destroyed – by the intrusion of handwork, by too great 
enlargement, by printing on a rough surface etc. – the integrity of the photograph is 
destroyed.”71 
 
“Beauty is truth, truth beauty. That is all ye know on Earth, and all ye need to know.” John Keats 
But the association between beauty and truth is not new. Stewart himself is quoting 
the poet John Keats in this regard, and actually begins the book with one of Keats’s 
poems that talked about beauty and truth. Though, he asks: “Was Keats right? is beauty                                                         
70 Mißelbeck, Reinhold (ed.), La fotografía del siglo XX. Museum Ludwig Colonia, Taschen GmbH, 
Koln, 2007, p. 19. 71 Weston, Edward, “Seeing photographically”, in Liz Wells (ed.), The Photography Reader, 
Routledge, 2006, p. 106. 
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truth, and truth beauty? The two are intimately connected, possibly because our minds 
react similarly to both.”72 But in which way did Keats perceive this truth/beauty around? 
Well, by means of a special state of conscience, called negative capability, “that is when 
man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching 
after fact and reason”. This description is pretty similar to the state of receptivity and 
identification with “the whole of life” recommended by many Purists, in order to catch a 
glimpse of the truth around. But this is also very reminiscent of the passivity typical to a 
certain phase in the development of the sexuality and denotes a very passive approach to 
the camera and the world – as in retracting almost completely and letting the camera do 
its job. This is a very dangerous polarization between the healthy narcissism of the 
identification with the world around and the virtually pathological one of the withdrawal 
from it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
72 Ibid., p. 275. 
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Three. Practical problems when taking Purism seriously 
Personal expression versus phantasmatic communication 
When talking about the relation between photography and art, the notion of 
“personal expression” is often invoked in both the discourses, the Pictorialist and the 
Purist one. Most often, personal expression is correlated with the field of art, being 
judged as unnecessary by that segment of the Purists who are not interested in any 
association between photography and the arts. The opinions vary, from Weston’s dismiss 
of the importance of personal expression in photography – “I’m not interested anymore in 
trying to ‘express myself’, in imposing my own personality upon nature […]”73 – to the 
frontal accusation formulated by the critic Sadakichi Hartmann, an adept of the Purist line 
of thought – “This ‘personal expression’ is recurrently required. And because in straight 
photography this ‘personal expression’ is extremely difficult to achieve, the artistic 
photographer started to imitate the artist […] But now is the time to respond, and 
honestly I hope that my words will count for those who will read this apology for the 
straight photography. I am deeply convinced that something will change if we are not 
willing to sacrifice what we acquired. I would love that creative photography be 
acknowledged among the fine arts. It is an ideal that I am fond to and for which I have 
fought many years; but I am equally convinced that this will be attained only be means of 
straight photography.”74 
In Hartmann’s view, personal expression is totally possible in straight photography, 
while the option to go into the Pictorial direction is solely an acknowledgment of the lack 
of skills that impede the photographer to manifest this personal expression using only 
traditional photographic means. So, the lack of talent and expertise are the reason for 
choosing the less noble Pictorialist art, apparently. It is a bit similar to what Emerson was 
saying – that Pictorialism, or impure photography, is only a confession of limitations –                                                         73 Weston, Edward, My Camera on Point Lobos, Da Capo Press, Nueva York, 1950, our translation, 
quoted in Joan Fontcuberta (ed.), Estética fotográfica, Introducción, p. 35-36. 
74 Hartmann, Sadakichi, A Plea for Straight Photography, in American Amateur Photography, no. 
16, New York, March 1904, quoted in Joan Fontcuberta (ed.), Estética fotográfica, Editorial 
Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 2003, Introducción, p. 34-35. 
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but actually in a completely different sense. Because Emerson was thinking that the 
possibility of straight and pure photography is very limited in fact, and that impure 
photography is an acceptance of these limitations, while Hartmann is saying that straight 
photography is possible and impure photography is a confession of the limitations of the 
photographer.  
However, there is a delicate problem to be taken into account here. This very 
ambitious ideal of expressing “personal content”, disposing only of very severe and 
minimalist tools – actually by instrumentalizing only the “pure” proficiency of the 
photographer – has its downsides and can lead to extreme subjectivity. It may happen that 
you are the only one that recognizes and responds to that information you intended to 
express, and that there is nobody on the receiving end. Or you can build an entire story, 
reinforced by a persuasive theory – story and theory that are completely coincidental to 
the substance of the photograph – in order to confer meaning retrospectively, to create a 
fictional texture in which to wrap the image. Sometimes it can be simply a title, other 
times can be a very sophisticated context that places the image at the intersection of many 
significant occurrences. This happen too often and I advance the hypothesis that this is 
also the case, for example, with Stieglitz’s Equivalents, even if saying this is like 
breaking a huge artistic taboo. 
Stieglitz created this series of photographs portraying clouds when he was already 
well known in the world of photography. The images themselves, taken separately, are 
not convincing. He changed the angle of positioning them75, clustered them together in a                                                         
75 “One of the most arresting aspects ot these pictures is how the orientation of ground/horizon/sky 
was dealt with when the finished prints were mounted. In many cases, this vertically layered 
orientation, normal in realist landscape presentation, was altered, sometimes by turning the print 90 
or 180 degrees. This was not a game, but part of a modernist strategy in which a traditional 
representation was consciously rejected. The technique had been seen earlier in some of Paaul 
Strand’s work, and O’Keeffe also utilized it. One of Stieglitz’s most famous pictures of O’Keeffe’s 
hands, made in 1920, carries the instruction that the photograph may be hung or oriented in any of 
the four cardinal points. In the clouds photographs, this alteres orientation was sometimes used to 
create and enliven the dynamic of the forms and their space. It also works in such a way that subtly, 
perhaps unconsciusly, we are made to feel edgy by sensing that something is wrong (meaning 
different from our ordinary experience of looking up the sky), but we cannot quite realize this 
sensation or what causes it. Stieglitz,’s goal in these sequences was to hekp regain the viewer’s 
equilibrium. Another aspect of these works is the rich, liquid tone of the prints themselves, together 
with their jewel’like size. The prints are some of the most luxurious that Stieglitz ever made. They 
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series, named them very audaciously The Equivalents and constructed a meaningful story 
to go with them. Supposedly, he made these images for a very simple reason: “I wanted 
to photograph the clouds to discover what I had learn from photography after forty years. 
By means of the clouds, to establish my philosophy of life, to prove that my photos are 
not indebted to the theme, neither to any special privileges: the clouds were here for 
anybody, there’s still no taxes upon them: they’re for free.”76 Photographing clouds in 
order to prove that he can make a good photograph out of anything proves, maybe, 
exactly the contrary, that whatever photograph he would make would have the same fate 
– success. Not to be deducted from here that clouds cannot make a good subject… 
 
 
Stieglitz’s Equivalents 
The manner in which these Equivalents were presented is crucial. Beaumont 
Newhall, in his History of Photography, describes Stieglitz’s exhibition: “He titled these 
photos ‘equivalents’ and displayed them in sequences with other photos with expressive 
gist, often evocative: a meadow shining with rain drops, the hands of a woman, with the 
palms hold together between her knees. He saw them as equivalents to his thoughts, ideas 
                                                        
are also some of the finest he made on silver paper, and their tone echoes the diaphanous atmosphere 
of the actual place where they were taken.” Peter C. Bunnell, Inside the Photograph. Writing on 
Twentieth-Century Photography, Aperture Foundation, New York, 2006, p. 27. 
76 Stieglitz, Alfred, “How I came to photograph clouds”, in The Amateur Photographer, vol. 56, 
1923, p. 255, quoted in Newhall, Beaumont, Historia de la fotografía, Editorial Gustavo Gili, 
Barcelona, 2002, our translation, p. 171. 
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and aspirations, his disillusions and fears.”77 The vicinity of the Equivalents to those 
evocative photos contributed, no doubt about it, to conveying them the feeling that was 
abundantly perspiring in the last ones; and designating them the symmetrical position of 
equivalence compared to his thoughts is another clever way to ascribe significance. It is 
like saying, if they are so like my thoughts, they must have the same load of conscience 
and resourcefulness. But does this mean communicating by “purely” photographic 
means? Because what Stieglitz did is almost equivalent to a contemporary gallery 
performance!  
But besides this rather happy situation, made possible by the context of the 
exhibition space, the real problem with this type of assumption – that straight 
photography is totally capable by conveying meaning – is that of eluding the Other from 
the scene, of confounding the ease with which you ascribe signification, with the 
eventuality that this signification be caught by the others, the non-you equivalents. It is, 
in a sense, a phantasmatic78 communication, because the real, fertile communication does 
not take place; what happens instead is that the subject/photographer isolates himself in a 
bubble of self-sufficiency, believing that whatever it is that he thinks, the others know it, 
by a sort of strange osmosis that allows them to enter his mind. And sometimes, the 
aesthetic focus gets to be entirely and regrettably lost, in favor of a search for the 
narcissistic Purism, that fills and refills itself by its own resources, losing all contact with 
the Other. Art cannot be totally non-retinal, cannot resume itself to simply 
communicating an idea – if this idea at least exists. Ideas can be very well communicated 
by other media channels, and aesthetizacion is an option that does not always lead to 
merriest results. 
 
                                                         77 Newhall, Beaumont, Historia de la fotografía, Editorial Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 2002, our 
translation, p. 171. 
78 The phantasm is an imaginary scenario in which the subject is present and that symbolizes, in a 
manner more or less distorted by the defense mechanisms, the fulfillment of a wish, and ultimately, 
of an unconscious wish. (http://www.srdp.ro) 
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Fables about the flawlessness of perception 
From this identification with nature, that we were talking about in the previous 
chapter, comes also a mechanical, non-reflective conviction that nature can be thoroughly 
and comprehensively known, and that this knowledge can be manipulated as the straight 
photographer desires it, as long as he did his homework well. This means acquiring a 
wide-ranging body of knowledge about the process of taking pictures – how to use light, 
angles, when is the best moment in day to start shooting, what is the ideal exposure time, 
the most adequate aperture etc. “Get your lighting and exposure correct at the start and 
both developing and printing can be practically automatic”, Weston thought79. Charles 
Caffin was very precise about the nature of this information: “[The photographer] must 
understand the laws of composition and also those laws that affect the distribution of 
lights and shadows; his eye must be trained to distinguish values, that means, the varied 
effects of light upon objects made of different materials, and the gradual changes of color 
in an object, depending on his proximity or distance from the point of view. These values 
suppose technical understanding that can be acquired […]”80 
The underlying idea that represent the basis of these recommendations for learning 
how to take pictures is that this knowledge guarantee one beautiful, but in the same time 
truthful pictures. However, the universality of this specific knowledge is not that 
guaranteed, nor it is guaranteed its flawlessness. First of all, because it can lead to a self-
assurance that can prove itself wrong, as in the example given by an “adversary” 
Pictorialist fellow photographer, Henry Peach Robinson: “Often one encounter certain 
effects, especially in cloudy landscapes, that seem uncanny, for the sensible observer, to 
be found in a photograph, but exactly these are the effects that, almost always, it is more 
important to keep and should never be ignored, even if it can happen that someone does 
not comprehend the effect and later say that it is false, and persisting in his mistake will 
say that the combined positive always produces falseness and therefore it must be                                                         79 Quoted in “Edward Weston on Photography”, in Peter C. Bunnell, Inside the Photograph. Writing 
on Twentieth-Century Photography, Aperture Foundation, New York, 2006, p. 65. 
80 Caffin, Charles H., “Photography as one of the fine arts”, in Joan Fontcuberta (ed.), Estética 
fotográfica, Introducción, p. 93. 
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censored. Well, it comes to my mind a little anecdote. Not long ago I send a photograph 
of a landscape and sky to a friend who’s standards in arts are excellent. My friend knew 
that sometimes I use the combined positive. His answer was: ‘Thanks for the photograph; 
the effect is great; sensational, actually, very beautiful; but it proves, inadvertently, what 
photography cannot do: your sky does not match with your landscape; you probably shot 
it in another time of the year. A photograph is nothing if it is not true to reality.’ Well, the 
truth is that the landscape and the sky have been photographed the same time […]”81 
  Carmen Aguado – Calcinatio (The project intents “to make 
visible that which cannot be seen, that the eye, in a simple clin d’œil, is incapable to catch”82. The photos 
are not manipulated, being obtained by using three different light types, condensed in a single one.) 
Another fable has to do with the superiority of the camera compared to that of the 
naked eye; and also its reverse version, the superiority of the eye compared to that of the 
camera, depending on the scientific comprehension of the time. This is a predilect subject 
for the Purists, because it is important to know which view is the most accurate, if you are 
to picture reality in real shades. Trusting the outstanding abilities of the camera, Paul 
Strand said: “We have a camera, a machine that science put in our hands, with its so-
called dead eye; the representation of the objects can be engraved upon a sensitive 
emulsion; starting with this negative you can make a positive copy that, without any 
external manual interference, will register a scale of tonal values in black and white                                                         81 Peach Robinson, Henry, “The Pictorial focus in photography”, in Joan Fontcuberta (ed.), Estética 
fotográfica, Introducción, p. 63-64. 82 Primavera Fotográfica 2002, Departament de la Cultura de la Generalitat de Catalunya, p. 330.  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beyond the ability of the human hand or the human eye. It can also record the differences 
of the texture of the objects in a way that the human hand couldn’t be capable of.”83 
Weston, too, thought that camera is finer: “The lens reveals more than the eye sees.”84 
Also a believer in the superiority of the camera at his beginning and a passionate 
apprentice of the science of optics, Emerson acknowledged later his distress about the 
deficiencies of the camera: “The control of the image is possible only in a limited degree, 
changing the focus, changing the exposure (but this means working blindly) of the 
developing, even if I doubt it […]”85 
So, who owns the better eye, the camera or the human, do the Purists seem to 
interrogate themselves. Is it the dead eye or the living eye? Because accepting to “work 
blindly”, as Emerson unintentionally puts it, would be a disaster for the Narcissus 
dwelling inside. It also appears that blindness is a symbol for castration, as Freud 
describes it starting with the fascinating, but terrifying story of the Sand-Man, that steals 
children’s eyes: “We know from psychoanalytical experience, however, that the fear of 
damaging or losing one’s eyes is a terrible one in children. Many adults retain their 
apprehensiveness in this respect, and no physical injury is so much dreaded by them as an 
injury to the eye. We are accustomed to say, too, that we will treasure a thing as the apple 
of our eye. A study of dreams, phantasies and myths has taught us that anxiety about 
one’s eyes, the fear of going blind, is often enough a substitute for the dread of being 
castrated. The self-blinding of the mythical criminal, Oedipus, was simply a mitigated 
form of the punishment of castration – the only punishment that was adequate for him by 
the lex talionis.”86                                                         83 Strand, Paul, “The artistic motivation in photography”, in Joan Fontcuberta (ed.), Estética 
fotográfica, Introducción, p. 108. 84 Quoted in “Edward Weston on Photography”, in Peter C. Bunnell, Inside the Photograph. Writing 
on Twentieth-Century Photography, Aperture Foundation, New York, 2006, p. 69. 85 Emerson, Peter Henry, quoted in Newhall, Beaumont, Historia de la fotografía, Editorial Gustavo 
Gili, Barcelona, 2002, our translation, p. 143, our emphasizing. 86 Freud, Sigmund, “The ‘Uncanny’”, in The Pelican Freud Library, vol. 14,  Art and Literature, 
translated by James Strachey, Penguin Books, London, 1986, p. 352. 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Real fiction versus fictional reality 
To post-process or not to post-process, that is the question. At least it was, for the 
Purists. And it is still today, for their heirs. In other words, to alter or not to alter. “The 
founding members [of the f/64 group, our add.] – Ansel Adams, Imogen Cunningham, 
John Paul Edwards, Sonya Noskowiak, Henry Swift, Willard Van Dyke and Edward 
Weston – formulated an aesthetic that appears now, retrospectively, as dogmatical in its 
strict specifications: any photograph that it is not precisely sharp in every detail, that it is 
not printed on shiny black and white paper, that it is not framed onto a white surface, that 
discloses any manipulation or that eludes the reality in what regards its theme, it will be 
considered ‘impure’.”87 With such relentless criteria, post processing – that was also 
available back then, even if it was not so convenient and sophisticated as it is today, 
thanks to the advanced post processing computer software, such as Photoshop – was 
obviously a crime.  
     
Darius Koehli  - What’s true? (This picture is the first of a series with the same title and invites the 
viewer “to enter a game about what is true and what is added in any photograph. It must be clearly 
understood that we are in front of ‘pure’ photographs, that are not faked or manipulated”88. While a 
pure photograoh may look this way, the discussion about the ability of pure photography to depict the 
real becomes futile…)                                                         87 Newhall, Beaumont, Historia de la fotografía, Editorial Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 2002, our 
translation, p. 188-192. 88  Primavera Fotográfica 2002, Departament de la Cultura de la Generalitat de 
Catalunya, p.282, our translation. 
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Real and reality was the name of the game, only that reality had such a modest 
meaning, so superficial in its vision and so empirically-limited. What is real? What the 
camera sees, what the human sees, or what exists out there, independent of the seeing? 
How do you decide what are the most appropriate settings for the controls of the camera, 
in order for it to accurately represent the reality? A slow shutter speed makes the running 
water look like a foam, a fast shutter speed makes it look frozen in the moment. The eye 
adapted itself to see it simply as running water, in its processuality, regardless of how 
correct or precise is this view compared to the factuality of the water running. But is there 
a way in which water runs actually? Therefore, if an image differs from how the eye 
normally perceives it, but it is nonetheless a correctly obtained image, a.k.a. straight 
photograph, is it acceptable to say that it represents the reality? And if yes, why? Only 
because it was not manipulated? And if no, why? Only because there is someone who can 
decide upon the right controls of the camera and the right utilization of it, in order to 
obtain realistic photographs? Is the microscope-obtained image the most accurate and 
representative of reality – because scientifically speaking it shows things as they are – , 
or are there other and other layers of the real that can be deconstructed indefinitely, while 
each of them represents the reality in a certain amount. Or you could say that all of them 
are equally realistic, but then you would have a trillion different images that all represent 
the same portion of reality, but neither one is similar to the other. But if there was some 
dust on my lens when I took the picture, and then I remove it during post-processing, just 
to present the things as they really were – cause obviously the immortalized fragment of 
reality wasn’t dusted – does this equal to an alteration of the reality? The truth is that 
there was some dust on the lens, and the dusty image reflects as a matter of fact a certain 
reality, but if I wouldn’t have been there, taking that picture, the reality outside my 
camera didn’t contain dust at all, or at least not displayed in that manner, all over it, as 
some obnoxious little particles obstructing my view. Unless I have some dust in my eyes, 
and this would make me see the reality in a different way – a dusty way… But this would 
be my way of seeing it; this would not change the way it really is. Or would it? Because 
the thing is that sometimes altering the picture equals to not altering the reality, and vice 
versa. 
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And what matters most, to present reality – in the sense of what really exists – or to 
take correct photographs? Because I can invent a non-existent entity or situation and 
record it correctly using the camera –without falsifying the photograph in any way –, but 
would this entity be real? We can say that it is a real fiction, if we want to follow the 
Purist dogma. That means that even it is an imaginary construction, due to the honest and 
straight way of being shot, it is nonetheless, somehow, real. In 1997, the photographer 
and photography theoretician Joan Fontcuberta created an ingenious story, that he 
documented with pictures and interviews and short films, story accordingly to which a 
certain Soviet astronaut, Ivan Istoichnikov, had disappeared during a space mission and 
had been erased from all official documents. Fontcuberta’s project, titled “Sputnik, the 
Odyssey of Soyuz 2”89, is so well constructed and so cleverly presented that it bears all 
the prerogatives of reality – or at least of what we believe we know about reality – and 
one picture of him, actually, dressed as Soviet pilot, raises this very question: what’s real? 
If some silly secret agent would investigate such a picture, using only basic knowledge 
about forging, and he would see that the picture is completely straight, wouldn’t he 
decide – and rightly so – that the picture represents a reality in its own right?  
 
Joan Fontcuberta’s “real fiction” – Sputnik project 
                                                        
89 http://www.fundacion.telefonica.com/at/sputnik.html 
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However, Purists’ idealized conception about reality does not ponder with such 
questions. Weston was a believer in “the camera’s innate honesty”90 and felt that this 
honesty “provides the photographer with a means of looking deeply into the nature of 
things, and presenting his subjects in terms of their basic reality.”91 But when Cartier-
Bresson, for example, was shooting one of his famous “decisive moment” photographs, 
completely pure of any post processing of the image and of any orchestration of the scene 
– supposedly – , wasn’t he inexorably trimming off some slice from the whole reality 
available in front of his camera? Not with the intention of maneuvering the reality, but 
just because he was paying attention to his mind eye, that exceptional eye that tells you 
what’s important and what’s not, what’s decisive and what’s not, that eye that makes you 
manipulate the reality without even knowing it.  
 
A few of Henri Cartier-Bresson’s “fictional realities” 
Why would that eye try to delude you? Simply because he has his own agenda and 
he’s paying attention to the unconscious thoughts and desires and motives. If at the same 
moment a wedding and a funeral happen, which one will you choose to shoot? If it’s the 
wedding of an anonymous person and the funeral of a celebrity, most probably you will 
choose the funeral. But for the relatives of the bride, the wedding is far more important. 
Or you may choose to shoot the wedding because you are afraid of death, or vice versa, 
                                                        
90 Weston, Edward, “Seeing photographically”, in Liz Wells (ed.), The Photography Reader, 
Routledge, 2006, p. 107. 
91 Idem. 
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choose to shoot the funeral because you are afraid of commitment. Whatever you choose, 
consciously or not, you choose it because it is important to you.  
Therefore, what’s important to one person may be completely insignificant to 
another one, and when choosing to present a partial and limited amount of reality one 
consciously chooses to create his own fiction, regardless of the fact that it did happen, so 
it is real, generally speaking. That partial and limited amount of reality chosen is a 
fictional reality: a piece of reality that plays a role, that started to exist, in a sense, after 
the photographer released it, after he made it known and maybe even famous – or, as 
Benjamin puts it, talking about the all-pervading presence of photography nowadays: if it 
wouldn’t have been shot, we could say that it didn’t even happen. 
 
Processing and fore-pleasure 
Joan Fontcuberta, 1976 
Looking at a manipulated picture that depicts an unfamiliar or even absurd 
situation, we experience different feelings – much stronger – than looking at a drawing or 
painting – however accurate – that depicts the same situation. This “amputated” man on 
his bicycle, surgically operated by Joan Fontcuberta, captivates the stares. Why? It’s not 
only the fact that the photograph is way more explicit and unambiguous than a drawing 
with a similar subject could ever be, but it’s also the fact the we know it was processed 
and we know it was different before – we know that there was a before and we know that 
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someone took the liberty to alter it, even if we like it or not. We may resent it as an 
impunity and may want to react, but we are also fascinated. It’s the type of fascination 
that Freud is referring to when talking about the concept of fore-pleasure. Art in general 
is meant to offer us this specific pleasure, that is called like that because it comes before 
the very act: it is the pleasure that the writing style of a writer or the painting style of a 
painter occasion, before us getting to the very act of digesting the content of the work of 
art, its sense(s). Before this sense, there is a sensibilization. “The writer softens the 
character of his egoistic day-dreams by altering and disguising it, and he bribes us by the 
purely formal – that is, aesthetic – yield of pleasure which he offers us in the presentation 
of his phantasies. We give the name incentive bonus or fore-pleasure to a yield of 
pleasure such as this, which is offered to us so as to make possible the release of still 
greater pleasure arising from deeper psychical sources.”92 Operating changes upon the 
image of a man in a picture, a man that exists in reality, not only in imagination, it is 
almost like operating changes upon a real body. We may feel suspicious, we may feel 
surprised, or we may even want to protest to the ingratitude of dismembering a person.  
For that reason, manipulating photos is by no means “a confession of limitations”, 
but a mesmerizing and powerful phantasmatic activity, an activity that allows the 
photographer to intervene upon an already existent material, to “deconstruct” it. It is 
somehow the reverse of both painting and sculpture, that are constructing something – 
painting starting from “nothing” and sculpture revealing the potential form, as Aristotle 
said. When the photographer intervenes upon the photographic material, for him it’s like 
playing a game, and for the viewer is an invitation to enter the game. 
 
Voyeurism and disbelief  
Pure or straight or simply documentary photography, whatever one calls it, is 
occupying profusely the space available in all types of media today, as if there is a huge                                                         92 Freud, Sigmund, “Writers and day-dreaming”, in The Pelican Freud Library, vol. 14, Art and 
Literature, translated by James Strachey, Penguin Books, London, 1986, p. 141. 
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demand for it, that never gets to be satiated. The photo-blogs multiply day after day, and 
everybody want to see pictures, more pictures, real-life pictures, real-life shows, real-life 
everything. The reality does exist out there, is fully available, then why this intense desire 
to see more and more photographs depicting it? Maybe photography does create a 
fictional reality, more attractive than the one happening in front of our own eyes.93 But 
there is also the luxury to sit and stare, that photography allows and that is more or less 
banned in the world next door. That luxury means the luxury to indulge in our own 
voyeuristic need to see, to look, to watch. In a sense, this specific request of being offered 
only what’s unmanipulated, what’s purely out of the camera, responds to the craving of 
consuming reality, of devouring it as a forbidden fruit.  
 
Si no lo veo, no lo creo – Jordi Bernadó and Martí Llorens 
But voyeurism means also passivity, it’s the counterpart of the active desire to show 
– the exhibitionism. However, it could hardly be said about the photographer that he 
shows/exhibits the merchandise that gets to be consumed by the passive voyeurist. It                                                         
93 Maybe seeing photographically, the marvelous sintagm coined by Weston, can be also seen 
reversely, and that could be one of the multiple possible explanations of the contemporary discontent 
with the real world. It could be that photography distorted somehow the way we see, the way we 
watch the world around us, trying to find those features encountered in the photographs. Seeing 
photographically may have been an useful technique for the photographers at its beginning, but it 
seems to have been converted itself into a deviation, a perversity of the view. We fetishistly look 
around searching for something, that photographic something. 
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would be a simple economic relation of demand and offer. The photographer is more 
likely hiding behind his camera, as if hiding behind an excuse to watch, to satisfy his 
voyeurism in a more direct, live mode. This pretension of the spectator to be fed pure 
photography is clearly related to the voyeuristic need to see. The alleged disbelief about 
processing and manipulation is not really tied up with the moral scruples, or with the 
humanly understandable desire of not being lied to, but with the stringent need of being 
sure that what one watches is a fact that can be consumed and fully enjoyed. Phantasies 
and inventions are not for the voyeur, they are too flimsy and they do not respond to his 
inner yearning. Voyeurism feeds itself with reality, or with what we consider to be real – 
the hot topics, the outrageous incident, the vulgar, the crude, the improper, the peculiar, 
the funny, the ugly, the fictional realities that each of us, at our turn, are nurturing in fact.  
Seeing may be different than watching, seeing can be, sometimes, the same with 
inventing, with imagining. Seeing may mean looking at the same thing that everybody is 
watching and still noticing something else. “Looking deeply into the nature of things”, as 
Weston said, could signify rather that, than respecting reality religiously, treating it as a 
sacred substance not to be impurified. 
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Four. The dismissal reaction of the digital photography as a contemporary 
mutation of the Purism 
A few introductory notes 
The end of the twentieth century brings with it a technological novelty that 
provokes a serious quake in the photographic environment: the invention of the digital 
cameras and soon, the large availability of this new gadget to wide audiences. Suddenly, 
photography turns into a most accessible hobby, serving all kind of purposes, from the 
most innocent to the most perverted. It’s true that photography already was a hobby, but 
now the simplicity of the entire process transforms it into a “pagan” leisure, with the 
worst consequences, in some’s opinion. William J. Mitchell, professor of architecture and 
media arts and sciences at MIT, utters nothing less than the death of photography as we 
know it: “From the moment of its sesquicentennial in 1989 photography was dead – or, 
more precisely, radically and permanently displaced – as was painting 150 years 
before”94.  
Soon to be, this apparent disaster is followed by another one: the development of 
professional computer programs and applications that are used along with the digital 
photography – and often offered as an annex tool, for the fun of the consumer – , 
programs meant to make possible the easy processing, montaging and “falsifying” of the 
photos. “Recognizing a growth market, software developers and publishers produced a 
widening repertoire of paint and image-processing systems for personal computers. This 
software soon became astonishingly sophisticated – making widely available, at low cost, 
capabilities hitherto accessible only to scientists working with laboratory image-
processing systems or graphics professionals working with advanced digital prepress 
systems. […] It became possible for anybody with a personal computer to fake 
photographs.”95 The evil is now complete and waiting to take its toll.  
                                                        
94 William J. Mitchell, The Reconfigured Eye. Visual Truth in the Post-Photographic Era, The MIT 
Press, fourth printing, 2001, first edition 1994, p. 20. 
95 William J. Mitchell, op.cit., p. 18-19 (our italics). 
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However, this is only the shallow part of the iceberg. The depth of it is apple of 
discord for the scholars, while the profanes are obviously just happy to go with it (not to 
mention the manufacturers, such as Canon, Nikon, Fuji etc.). But why is the digital a 
“pariah”? What are the reasons that undergo its wide – but not unanimous – dismissal 
from the part of the theoreticians in the field of photography? The list of arguments is 
sizeable, but somehow revolves around a few recurring items: the obliteration of the 
indexicality – inherent to the relation between the object and the picture, in the case of 
the analogical photography; the radical ontological and material discrepancy between the 
“portion of reality” and the image obtained in the case of the digital photos – discrepancy 
nonexistent, seemingly, in the case of the analogical; the drastic difference in the manners 
of correcting or adjusting the pictures in the case of the analogical and of the digital 
photography; the threat that represents the ease of digital processing and digital 
replication of photos, with the apocalyptic array of consequences with regard to the 
aesthetic, journalistic, social and political truth. 
 
The loss of the indexicality 
Let’s discuss the indexicality first. The concept of index is taken from Charles 
Peirce’s semiotic theory, and is part of the three sign typology, which includes nine 
nonexclusive categories: qualisign, sinsign, legisign, icon, index, symbol, rheme, 
decisign, and argument. “An «index» is a sign connected to its referent along a physical 
axis, such as a thumbprint or a footprint, offering a one-to-one correspondence with the 
thing it represents.”96 In the case of the analogical photography, that which is being 
photographed reflects itself onto the photosensitive surface (the film treated with silver or 
platinum salts…), through the mediation of light, and what remains on the film surface is 
an alike copy of what exists out there. This process of reflection mediated by light 
provides the “indexicality”, the connection between the object and the sign. Since in the 
case of the digital photography this situation changes dramatically, and what is being                                                         
96 Sabine T. Kriebel, “Theories of Photography, A Short History”, in James Elkins (ed.), 
Photography Theory, Routledge, New York, 2007, p. 26. 
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photographed is registered as digits, as “information” on a memory card, that virtually do 
not exists until it is downloaded into a computer, this relation of indexicality appears to 
be lost.  
This issue of indexicality makes a lot of rumor among the theoreticians of 
photography. Peirce himself pointed out the fact that a photo is “both an index and an 
icon, which establishes meaning through the effect of resemblance”97. One of the 
“iconic” personalities involved in the contemporary discussions about photography, 
Rosalind Krauss, underlines the fact that “the photograph is thus a type of icon or visual 
likeness, which bears an indexical relation to its object”98. For some, the deterioration of 
this connection seems unavoidable and sorrowful in the digital era: “Given the virtually 
indistinguishable appearance of digital and conventional photographs, the indexical 
qualities traditionally associated with photography for over a century and a half fall 
away.”99 
Joan Fontcuberta, photographer, curator and professor of visual communication, 
puts this problem in a very eloquent manner: “In the electronic age, photography suffered 
a desindexilizacion process. The new scenery gives to the image the linearity of the 
writing. Photography liberates itself from the memory, the object is missing, the index 
vanishes.”100 This way of putting the things cast a light upon the possible latent scenario 
that stands behind all this anxiety around “losing the indexicality”. Practically, the 
indexicality is the “canal” that connects the photographer with the “thing”, with that 
which is being photographed. When photography turns digital, this “canal” disappears, 
and it is like the possibilities of narcissistic investment are cut out. That fluid flow of the 
libido, from a Freudian perspective, between the object and the subject is drastically                                                         
97 Sabine T. Kriebel, op.cit., p. 26. 
98 Rosalind Krauss, “Notes on the Index: Part 1”, in Rosalind Krauss, The Originality of the Avant-
Garde and Other Modernist Myths, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1985, p. 203. 
99 Anne Collins Goodyear, “The Portrait, the Photograph, and the Index”, in James Elkins (ed.), 
Photography Theory, Routledge, New York, 2007, p. 213. 
100 Joan Fontcuberta (ed.), “Prólogo”, in Estética fotográfica, Editorial Gustavo Gili, SA, Barcelona, 
2003, primera edición, 1984, p. 12 (our translation). 
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altered, situation that creates an understandable panic in the unconscious. The concept of 
cathexis, developed by Freud101, is defined as the process of investment of mental or 
emotional energy in a person, object, or idea, and more specifically, in psychoanalysis, as 
libido’s charge of energy. When the discharge of the libido is hindered, the energies build 
up and eventually find a different outlet, or, for worse, regress to an earlier stage of the 
development of the ego (for example to the anal stage, for which the denomination of 
“anal-ogical” photography offers a funny and striking correlation). 
 It’s remarkable the insight with which Elkins appreciate this state of things, as if he 
“feels” there is something else at stake here: “For me at least, what’s really going on with 
the index is some hope people have about the real word; I don’t think the issue there is 
photography.”102 
 
Different ontological statuses? 
A second matter of contention in the dispute between analogical and digital is that 
of the alleged discrepancy between the “photographed” and the “photograph”. William 
Mitchell – whose repudiation of the digital domain is so extreme that he came to 
denominate as “photographs” only the analogical ones, and for whom the digital 
photographs are just “images”, as dull as it may sound – affirms: “A photograph is an 
analog representation of the differentiation of space in a scene: it varies continuously, 
both spatially and tonally. […] But images are encoded digitally by uniformly 
subdividing the picture plane into a finite Cartesian grid of cells (known as pixels) and 
specifying the intensity or color of each cell by means of an integer number drawn from 
some limited range.”103 He insists upon the fact that the analogical photo represents a                                                         
101 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia”, The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works, vol. XIV, London, The Hogarth Press, 1957. 
102 James Elkins (ed.), “The Art Seminar”, Photography Theory, Routledge, New York, 2007, p. 
201. 
103 William J. Mitchell, The Reconfigured Eye. Visual Truth in the Post-Photographic Era, The MIT 
Press, fourth printing, 2001, first edition 1994, p. 4-5. 
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precise copy of the reality, just because when enlarged, it reveals itself to be an 
“unbroken sequence of infinitely subtle gradations from black to white”, as Edward 
Weston put it, before the digital cameras even existed. Mitchell also quotes another fore-
speaker, Edgar Allen Poe, who was saying, in an article from 1840 (!), that “if we 
examine a work of ordinary art, by means of a powerful microscope, all traces of 
resemblance to nature will disappear”, relating this case to the case of the digital images, 
that reveals only the discrete pixels when are magnified.  
Let alone the fact that the case nowadays is completely different – Lev Manovich, 
ex-graphic designer and presently professor of new media, argues that today’s technical 
novelties, especially in what concerns the resolution of the images, make it possible for 
such an image to offer a far richer content: “So while a digitally stored image is still 
comprised of a finite number of pixels, at such resolution it can contain much finer detail 
than was ever possible with traditional photography. […] By the end of new media’s first 
decade, technology had already reached the point where a digital image could easily 
contain much more information than anyone would ever want”104 and that the pixel “no 
longer is the final frontier” – my first question is how do we know that the nature of 
reality is continuous, in order to be able to assert that analogical images are “analogous” 
to reality by virtue of their quality of continuity. The current state of the physics still 
implies a double nature of “the nature” – the wave-particle duality – which contradicts 
this naïve pretense that real world is as continuous and plain as a line. Moreover, when a 
“piece of nature” is studied on the microscope, it reveals its “granular” content: the cells, 
the electrons, the genes etc., much like the pixels, in a certain manner. Just because the 
film doesn’t exist in digital photography and because the information “first exists as 
mathematical data”105, that does not makes the information “inexistent”. It exists as 
energy bits on a memory card, and the fact that it is not visible until it is downloaded in a 
computer does not change its existence status. DNA is not visible without a microscope, 
but if you collect some of it from a living being, you can recompose him/her from it,                                                         
104 Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001, p. 53. 
105 Gordon Baldwin, Looking at Photographs: A Guide to Technical Terms, Los Angeles, John Paul 
Getty Museum and the British Museum Press, 1991, p. 37-38. 
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much the way digital photography works. Maybe one just needs more metaphysical 
qualities to seize that… 
Therefore, just because digital photography is “abstracting” the information, it does 
not mean that the way analogical photography is substracting is the way it must be. The 
defenders of the analogical are funding their views on the “eye’s view”, but this can be a 
deceptive premise. The “essence” of reality might not be implied by the continuity of 
lines, but could be closer to the “landscape” of pixels. Again, the unconditional character 
of the digital repudiation makes one wonder if there is not something else here “hiding in 
the bushes”. The way Joan Fontcuberta describes what happened at the dawn of the 
digital puts things in an interesting perspective: “The digital technology dematerialized 
photography, that today becomes pure information, content without matter, whose 
fascination power will be ruled by new factors.”106 This dematerialization could equal, 
for the unconscious, to a disintegration of the personality, a severe condition that occurs 
in cases of extreme psychopathology.  
   
Dona Clara, 2005 – Pixels recreated and ironically turn into an artwork 
Moreover, the already fragile existence of an “original” in analogic photography is 
practically abolished in the time of the digital. While philosopher Walter Benjamin was                                                         
106 Joan Fontcuberta (ed.), “Prólogo”, in Estética fotográfica, Editorial Gustavo Gili, SA, Barcelona, 
2003, primera edición, 1984, p. 12 (our translation). 
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arguing, back in 1936, about the fact that the work of art lost its aura in the time of 
mechanical reproduction, photography still had a chance to reclaim an original, at least 
metaphorically speaking. In fact, this is what Joan Fontcuberta implies when stating that 
Ansel Adam’s negatives were so marvelous “that were converting the photographical 
print in an artistic object”107. Well, in digital photography there is no negative, 
whatsoever, and from this it is easy to appreciate what follows – photography looses 
completely its aura, its chance to request an artistic status and, finally, its identity.  
 
Re-making pictures 
Another argument brought to the discussion is that of the difference of processing 
the photos (the post-production), in the cases of analog and digital. For many reasons, to 
the defenders of the “new” Purist position, it seems that the ease, the speed and the 
amazingly credible results of “manipulating” the digital photos are a counter-argument 
for using them, an intrinsic flaw of these images. On this point, Michael Rush, a 
renowned artist, filmmaker and critic, says: “For some critics, computer based art lacks 
the depth of interest they associate with, for example, abstract painting. They find it 
boring, or like holography, too superficial in its trickery.”108  
Defending the idea of the scarcity of manipulation in analogical photography, 
Mitchell invokes Paul Strand, noting that “photo manipulation of any sort was not only 
difficult, but also unphotographic and fundamentally undesirable”.109 What we have here 
is actually a transformation into contrary, a well known concept in psychoanalysis and 
actually the very basis of the Christian morale, as Nietzsche exposes it – in other words, 
because it’s difficult, because it’s tough, because it’s unattainable, it means it’s valuable, 
it’s moral, it’s good. Mitchell ascribes even more qualities to analogical photography,                                                         107 Joan Fontcuberta, Fotografía: Conceptos y procedimientos, una propuesta metodológica, 
Editorial Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 1990, p. 168. 
108 Michael Rush, New Media in late 20th-Century Art, Thames and Hudson, London, 2001.  
109 William J. Mitchell, op.cit., p. 7. 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solely on the basis of their “fragility”: “here photography and digital imaging diverge 
strikingly, for the stored array of integers has none of the fragility and recalcitrance of the 
photograph’s emulsion-coated surface.”110 Moreover, the defense of the analogical and 
the repudiation of the digital takes the tremendous dimensions of a megalomaniacal 
crusade for the protection of the lost values of the humanities: “The variations of the 
shade and the gradations of both linear and aerial perspective [in the case of analogical 
photography, our addition], are those of the truth itself in the supremeness of its 
perfection”111. 
 Scrutinizing the approach of these questions, we can easily perceive the same type 
of arguments that are to be found in the arguments of the Purists, a species apparently 
extinct in the world of photography nowadays – with the exception of the cohorts of 
amateurs, who still declare, from time to time, their affiliation to one direction or another, 
unaware of the current state of the new media (photography included). We are dealing 
with the same blind attachment to the concept of truth as paradoxical molding structure of 
the aesthetic judgment, the same inflexibility and skepticism as to the possibility of the 
aesthetic emotion and the same normative treatment of the context of the relations 
between image, proceedings, object and outside intervention (or relation between the 
participants to the semiotic relationship).  
 Since now there is more tolerance toward the practice of adjusting the photos, the 
Purist attitude finds venting in the brand new debate of the antagonism between 
analogical and digital, as an opportunity to express its authoritarian view of the world, 
deep-rooted in a primary narcissism. The unconscious motivations that lurk beneath are 
rationalized in the form of aesthetic and moral reasoning, however its conflicting nature 
reveals itself in the impossibility to produce a solid explanation and argumentation for the 
exclusion or the neutralization of the criticized practices. 
 
                                                        
110 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The threat of the technological Other 
Furthermore, there is an almost palpable apprehension at the idea of a medium that 
allegedly does not respect the nature of “the nature”, that is in some way “too” 
technologically different, too advanced and too “cold”. The digital, computerized camera 
is regarded as being an “Other”, in the Lacanian understanding of the term as the big 
Other. Michelle Henning gives us a very clear vision of what it is perceived like the 
camera, as technological device: “The camera is one of a number of machines (including 
telephones and computers), which appear to be like prosthetics in that we treat them as 
extensions of our own bodies but which change the ways we physically engage with the 
world. The very presence of the camera transforms the scene, it intervenes in reality. The 
camera threatens to take over and displace the eye […]”112 This terrible fear and refusal 
of the technological progress seems to point to an equally terrible camouflaged 
Narcissism: an analogy would be the case of someone that today would refuse to take the 
plane and would hope and try to fly by himself, with wooden wings, simply because he 
would feel that he can do it, just like that. 
This intention to exclude the digital medium takes such a paranoid shape, that it 
goes so far as to equal this medium to an universal deceit: “with the end of truth in 
photography has come a corresponding loss of trust […] every image, every 
representation is now a potential fraud”113. This strange, but somehow comprehensible 
fear of technology is, at a closer look, inconsistent, because the camera “takes” photos, 
the computer “processes” them, the printer “prints” them, but behind all these is still the 
man. When William J. Mitchell ostentatiously articulates “How pictures do things with 
us”, he sounds very eloquent, but he ascribes to man a blatantly passive role, 
coincidentally or not, the same passive attitude that epitomize the anal phase of the ego’s 
development in psychoanalysis. More common sense and, why not, optimism regarding 
the future of manhood along with that of technology can offer, I am sure, a much more                                                         
112 Michelle Henning, “The subject as object: Photography and the human body”, in Liz Wells (ed.), 
Photography: A Critical Introduction, third edition, Routledge, 2004, p. 183. 
113 Anthony Aziz and Sammy Cucher, about their project The Dystopia Series, quoted in Michael 
Rush, op.cit., p. 186. 
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productive and healthy perspective over the art realm today. As Michael Rush puts it, 
“the most dynamic work occurs when the technology catches up with the visions of the 
artists, or, conversely, the artists catch up with the technology.”114 
Fortunately, there are contemporary perspectives that can decant the good part from 
the ‘bad” one, such as that of London-based curator and writer Susan Bright, who’s 
observing that “the digital revolution had an incredible impact, only a short while ago, 
reaching the point that some already don’t ask themselves if photography is art, but if it’s 
photography. But the dynamism and volatility that characterize the photographic practice 
are not the final blow to the medium, as many Purists are thinking, because these are 
rather fundamental improvements, of big importance for its existence.”115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
114 Michael Rush, op.cit., p. 192. 115 Bright, Susan, Fotografía hoy, Nerea, San Sebastián, 2005, p. 8, our translation. 
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Five. What happened to Purism? What happened to Narcissus? 
An historical overview. 
From the New Vision to the New Subjectivity 
After such heated debates between the two factions, Purism started to fade as a 
movement, both in its theoretical approaches and in its manifest deeds. As Joan 
Fontcuberta says, “at such a level of consensus, Purism started to convert itself into an 
extremely vague concept. The photographers that were militating for this tendency  
started to separate in different stylistic directions.”116 Following the resolute photographic 
principles of the supporters of the New Objectivity, with their unbiased pursuit of the 
crisp and brittle reality, the world of photography relaxes as after a dictatorship. From the 
ashes of all the fiery contentions, it emerges the serene genius of the New Vision, the 
Hungarian painter and Bauhaus professor Moholy-Nagy. His generous renaissance view 
upon the world of the photographic gives this artistic practice a new meaning. “The 
enemy of photography is the convention”, said Moholy-Nagy, “its salvation comes from 
the experimenter that dares to call ‘photography’ anything obtained by photographical 
means, with or without a camera.”117  
He talks about this “new vision” in an essay titled “A new instrument of vision” 
(1932), speaking about photography as never before and bringing about that je ne sais 
pas quoi, that this “sublimated technique” has: “Today it is in a fair way to bringing 
(optically) something entirely new into the world. The specific elements of photography 
can be isolated from their attendant complications, not only theoretically, but tangibly, 
and in their manifest reality. […] Indeed, this advance in technique almost amounts to a 
psychological transformation of our eyesight […] In photography we must learn to seek, 
not the ‘picture’, not the aesthetic of tradition, but the ideal instrument of expression 
                                                        116 Joan Fontcuberta (ed.), “Introducción”, in Estética fotográfica, Editorial Gustavo Gili, SA, 
Barcelona, 2003, primera edición, 1984, p. 37 (our translation). 
117 Moholy-Nagy, Lazlo, quoted in Joan Fontcuberta, Fotografía: Conceptos y procedimientos, una 
propuesta metodológica, Editorial Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 1990, p. 53. 
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[…]”118 Undeniably, we are very far from the naïve Purist conception about sight, and 
also about nature, because, as Molly Nesbit, theoretician of photography, says, “for him, 
nature was only a brute material made available for art, a material that should be regarded 
by means of a photographic camera, that should be toiled and converted into the new 
vision.”119 In her opinion, the phenomenon Moholy-Nagy is very much related to the 
Bauhaus movement: “Just as Bauhaus was concentrating the total amount of its energy on 
constructing and furnishing buildings (Bau), Moholy-Nagy situated the Bauhaus 
photography amidst a greater problematique, that of the place of the image in the modern 
industrial culture, that of the necessary transformations and of the functions of the new 
image.”120 
       
Photograms by Lazlo Moholy-Nagy                         and Man Ray 
Moholy-Nagy was not a stranger from the Russian constructivism and from the 
Dada movement, and together with another photographer, the American Man Ray, shares 
                                                        118 Moholy-Nagy, Lazlo, “A new instrument of vision”, in Liz Wells (ed.), The Photography 
Reader, Routledge, 2006, p. 92-95. 
119 Molly Nesbit, “Photographie, art et modernité (1910-1930)”, in Lemagny, Jean-Claude et Rouillé, 
André (eds.), Histoire de la photographie, Bordas, 1993, our translation, p. 116. 120 Molly Nesbit, “Photographie, art et modernité (1910-1930)”, in Lemagny, Jean-Claude et 
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a common passion for the photogram121 – that Man Ray calls rayogram – and with them 
probably begin the photographic manifestations specific to the Surrealism. Actually, the 
photogram was a favorite surrealist technique, but it was also approved of other isms of 
the time: “If the Surrealists saw in the photogram a path of access to a certain 
unconscious of the reality, to its occult dimension, the artists related to Constructivism 
and other derived ‘isms’ (Russian suprematism, Dutch neoplasticism etc.) were interested 
in its formalist aspect – that was to be applied in design and publishing and advertising 
graphics – and, above all, as a broadening of the sensible experience, as an enrichment of 
the visual reality.”122  
At that very moment, lots of artists come to Paris, joining those already performing 
there, as if just to coagulate and coalesce into a fresh new ars mundi: Atget (who was to 
remain unknown until after his death), Man Ray, Lee Miller (at first Ray’s assistant), 
Andre Kertesz, Germaine Krull, Emmanuel Sougez, Berenice Abbott, Paul Outerbridge, 
Dali, Brassaï, Bill Brandt… It is like the photographic world suddenly expanded – not 
spatially, although this also happened, but in its pervasive and all-encompassing 
viewpoint – , these circumstances manifesting just like an astronomical effect, 
materialized at a more down-to-earth level, within the context of a young and ambitious 
art field (or wanna-be art field). All of a sudden, the ideas multiply, the visions permeate 
each other, new and not-so-new practices begin to flourish, as if someone inadvertedly 
had been pressed a magic button. Everything seems to change, and the ex-Purist candid 
views are constantly discarded and fought to, while all their old taboo are infringed and 
trespassed over and over again, and with great success. “What appeals to the 
photographer”, Brassaï uttered, “is exactly this possibility to penetrate the phenomena, to 
reap their forms. Oh! This impersonal presence! This perpetual incognito!”123 The 
Purism, however, is not an extinct species: “The surrealists were attracted by the direct  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engraving and the mechanical reproduction specific to photography. But other groups of 
the Parisian avant-garde, the Purists, for example, were also interested in 
photography.”124 Still, the realm of the real will never be the same – the theories that 
explain and envision it already went beyond any acceptable limit for the Purism and it 
seems there is no way back, because already “photography interprets and filters the 
real”.125 
The historical conditions cannot be ignored, whatsoever, and they do have their say 
in all this effervescence. Jean-Claude Lemagny, the editor of one of the most highly 
regarded history of photography written until today, observes the fact that right before the 
second world war, it existed that special moment when things were so promising in all 
fields of art, that everything was about to explode. Well, it exploded somehow, just not 
the right way. However, for photography there is no right way, not in this sense anyway. 
During the war(s), photography and photographers pulled everything that could be pulled 
– the moral probity or plain mercy didn’t matter anymore, because moral probity was 
looked on, in those days, as taking its referent somewhere else than in the context of 
morally acceptable acts, but instead in the same universe of discourse, that of 
photography. Therefore, moral probity meant loyalty to the photographic art. 
Following the wars, documentary photo – a successful tacit prolongation of the 
Purism – gained a well-deserved fame, and it influenced imperceptibly upon the styles of 
the photographic craft. Photographers made famous by the wars, such as Robert Capa, 
Pere Catala Pic, Henri Cartier Bresson, Eugene Smith, became so influent that it is 
difficult not to consider their points of view and their discourse about the “integrity” that 
a photography must guarantee. Because of them, there is an sudden revival of the appeal 
of humane-straight-simple photography, as if world suddenly remembers what’s 
important in this war-devastated blatant reality. You can almost touch this striking 
consequence in Robert Doisneau’s sincere and beautiful images, “with his human                                                         124 Molly Nesbit, “Photographie, art et modernité (1910-1930)”, in Lemagny, Jean-Claude et 
Rouillé, André (eds.), Histoire de la photographie, Bordas, 1993, our translation, p. 119. 125 Colin Osman, “La photographie sûre d’elle-même (1930-1950)”, in Lemagny, Jean-Claude et 
Rouillé, André (eds.), Histoire de la photographie, Bordas, 1993, our translation, p. 166. 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understanding, tact and tenderness”126. Colin Osman, editor-in-chief of the British 
magazine Creative Camera, places in fact Doisneau along the same blood-line of the 
Purist genealogy: “Doisneau joins the greatest moments of pure photography, pursuing 
the humble pathway of being thoughtful about the others.”127 
Fresh from the war zone, Edward Steichen is hired to be in charge of developing the 
new department of photography, founded by Beaumont Newhall. Obviously, he dwells 
the same area of postbelic-regenerated Purism, that extols the “beauty of humanity”, that 
states that “life is a marvelous thing”128. He decides to commission an exhibition larger 
than life, just to shake up the humanity from its sleeping-beauty sleep. The exhibition was 
to be entitled “Family of Man”. Because of its ambitious all-inclusive intentions, it 
reminds us somehow of the fiasco Pictorialist composition realized way back in 1845 by 
David Octavius Hill and Robert Adamson, although Steichen’s exhibition was a huge 
success. At least at its beginning. The central idea of the exhibition was to illustrate the 
fact that the essence of the humanity is the same all over the world, mission for which 
Steichen traveled indeed all over the world, reviewing millions of photos. In fact, Colin 
Osman establishes as possible starting moment of the modern or even contemporary 
photography the year 1955, the year of this exhibition at Moma, in New York. But 
despite being an American bestseller, the exhibition disturbs the sleep of someone who 
wasn’t beautifully sleeping: Roland Barthes. “The failure of photography”, replies 
Barthes, “seems to me flagrant in this case: literally repeating the death or the birth 
                                                        126 Colin Osman, “La photographie sûre d’elle-même (1930-1950)”, in Lemagny, Jean-Claude et 
Rouillé, André (eds.), Histoire de la photographie, Bordas, 1993, our translation, p. 184. 127 Colin Osman, “La photographie sûre d’elle-même (1930-1950)”, in Lemagny, Jean-Claude et 
Rouillé, André (eds.), Histoire de la photographie, Bordas, 1993, our translation, p. 184. 128 Steichen, Edward, quoted in Colin Osman, “La photographie sûre d’elle-même (1930-1950)”, in 
Lemagny, Jean-Claude et Rouillé, André (eds.), Histoire de la photographie, Bordas, 1993, our 
translation, p. 184. 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doesn’t help us with anything, this does not eternize the human gestures, unless maybe to 
neutralize them.”129 
Yet another vision comes with Otto Steinert’s New Subjectivity, that ultimately 
states the prominence of the subjective in all the photographic endeavors. “In fact”, Jean-
Claude Lemagny paradoxically recounts, “for him what it’s about is subjectively 
acknowledging the limits of photographic objectivity”130. Under the tag Subjektive 
Fotografie, he runs three exhibitions in Germany, in 1951 and 1954 in Saarbrücken, and 
in 1959 in Koln. His intention was, for post-war German art, to get to know the avant-
garde photography of the moment, but also to bring a new fresh breath to it. “The 
importance of Steinert’s conception”, explains Petr Tausk in his history of the twentieth 
century photography, “consisted in the accent put on the personal interpretation of the 
reality, via the subjective imagination of the image, that springs from specific emotional 
experiences.”131 
Inspired by these transfigurations that set free the imaginary, photographers like 
Aaron Siskind and Harry Callahan, in United States, start their own crusade “to show the 
object in a new manner that makes it more intense”132. The very personal itineraries 
burgeon, from Minor White’s mystical take to Robert Frank’s metaphysical one. The rule 
of the game is no longer photocopying reality, but turning it upside down, infusing it. For 
Minor White, photography functions “by way of certain privileged states of mind of the 
                                                        129 Barthes, Roland, quoted in Colin Osman, “La photographie sûre d’elle-même (1930-1950)”, in 
Lemagny, Jean-Claude et Rouillé, André (eds.), Histoire de la photographie, Bordas, 1993, our 
translation, p. 185. 130 Lemagny, Jean-Claude, “Les années cinquante: les fondateurs de la modernité”, in Lemagny, 
Jean-Claude et Rouillé, André (eds.), Histoire de la photographie, Bordas, 1993, our translation, p. 
188. 131 Tausk, Petr, Historia de la fotografía en el siglo XX, Editorial Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 1978, p. 
136. 132 Callahan Harry, quoted in Lemagny, Jean-Claude, “La photographie inquiète d’elle même 
(1950-1980)”, in Lemagny, Jean-Claude et Rouillé, André (eds.), Histoire de la photographie, 
Bordas, 1993, our translation, p. 189. 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watcher-image maker”133, while Frank delimits himself from pre-made concepts: “the 
essential must not come «from my movements, as the decisive moment, but from within 
myself»”134. Does this mean that Purism lived its living? Rather not, it will make its way, 
undertaking all kinds of identities, as an immortal life form, that continuously 
metamorphoses itself, proving a most resilient conservatory instinct. 
 
The postmodern and the contemporary 
But the coup d'état comes with the Postmodernism. All that was postulated, all that 
was considered fixed or at least arguable, is out of the blue questioned, doubted, 
discarded, demolished and blasted. The Postmodernism, that owes the fame of its name to 
French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard, is like a cuantic leap that ditches all the 
preexistent theories into the garbage bin of the history. Everything must be reexamined, 
everything is prone to be considered suspect, nothing is undisputable. From this point on, 
any possible intention to speak in the name of the Purism or of any other clear-cut artistic 
agenda and philosophy, however shy it would pronounce itself, is doomed. 
Postmodernism is like an anarchic Cartesian doubt, that does not take anything for 
granted and wants to review and revise any single theoric and stereotypical construct. 
Actually, these are its major deeds: localizing and deconstructing stereotypes, brain-
washing our locus communis, our fears and habits and boredom, removing yet another 
layer of lie, of tale, of the “big tale”. And, finally, pointing to all the tales – the narratives 
– in our history of thought. 
Postmodernism abrogates the idea of the author, and so all the discussions about 
photography find here an unexpected and sometimes paradoxical resolution. The 
controversies about photography being or not being art, about the photographer being or                                                         133 Lemagny, Jean-Claude, “La photographie inquiète d’elle même (1950-1980)”, in Lemagny, 
Jean-Claude et Rouillé, André (eds.), Histoire de la photographie, Bordas, 1993, our translation, p. 
191. 134 Frank, Robert, quoted in Lemagny, Jean-Claude et Rouillé, André (eds.), Histoire de la 
photographie, Bordas, 1993, our translation, p. 193. 
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not being an artist, about the nature of the medium, about the purity of it, about the index, 
about the import of the creator or his witness-like quality, all find their peace in the 
postmodern era. Even more, photography becomes the postmodern art by definition and 
all its minuses become pluses, as Fontcuberta profoundly notices it: “Photography 
converts itself into the postmodern art by excellence; the features that until know had 
been regarded as shortcomings get to be considered by now advantages, something that 
impulses numerous artists that had build their careers using other languages shift their 
interest toward photography”135. It comes to be viewed as the author-less art, the 
achievable collective-meaning construct, the relational136 artistic product, the affordable 
and communitarian and transparent and disclosing art. Maybe it was not what the Purists 
wanted, but it’s what happened.  
Postmodern photography was abundantly influenced by pop-art, by the proliferation 
of the artistic establishments – museums, art foundations, publications, galleries, 
educational institutions – , by the development of mass media, especially of the fashion 
media (Richard Avedon, Irving Penn, Helmut Newton), by the publicity boom. Artists 
like Andy Warhol, Marcel Duchamp, David Hockney, all put their imprint on the 
photographic journey. New advances in technology and science brought upon the good 
and the bad – the accessibility of photography and the banalization of it. Surprisingly, 
this wasn’t a hindrance – banality137 became attractive, banality meant in fact salvation 
from preciosism. Then came the turn of conceptual art to intervene on the scene, but the                                                         135 Joan Fontcuberta (ed.), “Prólogo”, in Estética fotográfica, Editorial Gustavo Gili, SA, 
Barcelona, 2003, primera edición, 1984, p. 10 (our translation). 
136 The adjective relational became currency in the aethetical debates thanks to French curator and 
theoretician Nicolas Bourriaud, who writes about a new form of artistic product, that is assembled by 
means of a joint action, that of the artist and of the public, basically. Therefore, it is due to the 
relation between them. This type of artistic expression is common to contemporary art practices, 
such as happening or performance.  137 The attraction that the banal exercises in photography is the main idea of one recent motion 
picture, “One Hour Photo” – title that also points to the swiftness of getting pictures done today. The 
main character works at the photo-developing department of a local megastore. Little by little, he 
becomes obsessed with one family - his customers – and practically begins to get psychologically 
involved in their life. It’s not like they’re doing exceptional things, but he simply wants to have their 
life. It’s those little somethings, that when get to be photographed, virtually become something more, 
embroidering a texture and life of their own. 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intervention was twofold – in truth, practically all relation between art forms and 
photography are from now on twofold, interplayed.  
The new photographers are dipping in different waters: “Lewis Baltz (USA), Bernd 
and Hilla Becher (Germany) explored the act of looking, as well as topographic 
features”138. Also now are put the foundations of Land Art, an art form where 
photography finds a surprisingly good niche, seeing that, as Liz Wells explains it, “here, 
the photograph is the record, and the final product of an engagement with or intervention 
within the rural. Works by British artists, such as Hamish Fulton, Richard Long and 
Andy Goldsworthy, has become well known not through direct experience of the results 
of their investigations and interventions, but through their photographs. […] Ultimately, 
only the picture remains.”139 
Purism as well finds a good niche, because the Vietnam war and all the political 
conflicts and complications of the time represent a sempiternal motive to reclaim 
forthright illustration. It is however a Purism in new clothes, since “the time of symbolic 
images of the great atemporal truths was terminated. By now, you could not solely abide 
by without judging.[…] It means catching, at the corner of the street, in the fleet of the 
moment, visual encounters of such perfection, that it evokes the thoughtfully elaborated 
compositions of a painting that liberated itself from the hazard of reality.”140 It seems like 
a real impiety to talk about Purism mentioning the word “painting”, but nonetheless 
reasonable, because in Lemagny’s opinion, these are “the new ways of direct 
photography”. In fact, the issue of an obvious association of the two spheres – (plastic) 
art and photography – grows to be a familiar issue now, without anybody bringing up 
anymore the question of the Pictorialist evasion. Artist and writer Philippe Dubois dares                                                         138 Liz Wells, Photography: A Critical Introduction, Routledge, 2006, third edition, edited by Liz 
Wells, p. 275. 139 Liz Wells, Photography: A Critical Introduction, Routledge, 2006, third edition, edited by Liz 
Wells, p. 276. 140 Lemagny, Jean-Claude, “La photographie inquiète d’elle même (1950-1980)”, in Lemagny, 
Jean-Claude et Rouillé, André (eds.), Histoire de la photographie, Bordas, 1993, our translation, p. 
201. 
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to say more, that “they never stopped, from the very beginning and on both sides, to 
engage in inextricable relations, of attraction or rejection, of incorporation or 
repudiation.”141 
 The gaze through the photographic lens lives on its marvelous adventure, maybe 
because it was already impossible to undo what Postmodernism had done. Removing the 
“veil of ignorance” had liberating effects, that were so sanitizing for art. Somehow, the 
regress provoked by the second world war was settled up by the mind-blowing 
postmodern effect. The Purists’ fanatical relations with reality, even if it survives in 
confined photographic enclaves, loses its universality, since it no longer has enough 
batteries to energize anybody. “For a long time, photography was considered being 
something that could not detach itself from the immediate reality, that didn’t allow 
imagination to run free. Well, this contemporary photography significantly consecrates to 
overturn this old conviction and completely invalidate the situation.”142 Abyssal 
psychology blurs the confines of the once authoritative theory, coming into sight literally 
speaking. And so, reality gets to be doubled by the internal reality, and these two can live 
in conflict or in peace. Labeled as expressionist, the unique Diane Arbus talks in 
Kristeva143-like terms and perceives the world in her very own terms: “The concentrated 
stare, materialized through photography, is precisely what «makes us recognize that 
which we never saw». But if it partakes to the real, to the faces, it does not depletes them. 
On the contrary, «because a photograph is a secret about a secret, and the more it says to 
you, the less you know about it».”144 Japanese photography, for example, that meanwhile 
                                                        141 Philippe Dubois, “La photographie et l’art contemporain”, in Lemagny, Jean-Claude et Rouillé, 
André (eds.), Histoire de la photographie, Bordas, 1993, our translation, p. 232. 142 Lemagny, Jean-Claude, “La photographie inquiète d’elle même (1950-1980)”, in Lemagny, 
Jean-Claude et Rouillé, André (eds.), Histoire de la photographie, Bordas, 1993, our translation, p. 
221. 
143 Reference to Julia Kristeva, the French-Bulgarian born psychoanalist and feminist writer, that 
developped a very peculiar essayistic style, no doubt influenced by Lacan’s own distinctive style.  144 Arbus, Diane, quoted in Lemagny, Jean-Claude, “La photographie inquiète d’elle même (1950-
1980)”, in Lemagny, Jean-Claude et Rouillé, André (eds.), Histoire de la photographie, Bordas, 
1993, our translation, p. 206. 
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made its way up to the avant-scene, “seems to have been accepted from the start a certain 
stylization of the real”.145 
What happens in contemporary photography? Well, “any attempt to overview 
recent photo-based art”, declares Liz Wells, “is fraught with difficulty, not only because 
of diversity of form and subject-matter, but also because of the lack of the benefit of 
hindsight”146. Nevertheless, it would seem that the lack of hindsight is the smallest of the 
problems in defining photography and photo-art right now. At present, some say that 
photography is no longer photography. Or that it is, but it is also something else, 
something more, or something less sometimes. We came to talk, nowadays, about post-
photography. Or at least this is the name by which the influent writer Geoffrey Batchen 
baptized it. Have we already left behind photography as we know – or knew it – and 
arrived to a new species alive and well in today art-scape? Or is it just an artifice, 
skillfully devised to blow or minds once again and leave us in awe? Let’s check it out, so 
to speak. First of all, if we investigate just what contemporary photography means from 
the point of view of art history, we cannot ignore a peculiar bending – an appraisal of 
photography similar to the tense monitoring of a likely competitive advantage of this one: 
“The 80’s decisively confirmed photography due to the success of a group of artists that 
already didn’t use it just for documenting ephemeral or difficult to access works, but 
were making use of it as autonomous images. This involved the valuation of its qualities 
as object (coloring, texture, dimensions etc.), causing, on one hand, a concluding change 
of status of the photographers, that became artists, and, on the other hand, the absorption 
of the photographic technique by the world of art, that discovers the multiple possibilities 
offered by its hybridizing with other languages. […] From that moment on, the 
                                                        145 Lemagny, Jean-Claude, “La photographie inquiète d’elle même (1950-1980)”, in Lemagny, 
Jean-Claude et Rouillé, André (eds.), Histoire de la photographie, Bordas, 1993, our translation, p. 
206-207. 146 Liz Wells, Photography: A Critical Introduction, Routledge, 2006, third edition, edited by Liz 
Wells, p. 285. 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protagonism and versatility of photography in the art formula nowadays could not help 
but growing.”147  
This tension from the part of the art world may be perfectly justified, but it is 
nonetheless paralleled by a tense climate in the photographic contemporary world. The 
massive entrance of photography in the gallery encouraged it to metamorphose and 
renovate itself immensely, proving a genuine gift for mirroring, but in a deeper sense that 
anyone could have suspect it. Its multifaceted and chameleonic temperament simply 
couldn’t refuse the chance to have it all – have the cookie and eat it too. It wasn’t enough 
for it anymore that it was welcome in the gallery, she just wanted more: to undermine the 
top position of its old rival, the painting. And since it was there, why not undermine the 
sculpture too... “In a number of works by Mike and Doug Starn, for example, the 
photograph has been twisted and shaped into a sculptural element. Yellow and Blue Raft 
of the Medusa (1990-1991) turns a reproduction of Gericault’s famous painting into a 
series of translucent planes that contemptuously curl off the wall to show us their edges. 
The photograph’s thickness, the part of its existence that is usually thought of as mere 
support, is made one of its primary features. In similar fashion, Jennifer Bolande co-opts 
a strip of lurid landscape that one day rained down on her from a Kodak light box 
billboard above the Marriott Hotel in New York. Her Orange photograph (1987) is this 
same strip hung from the wall, cascading down across the floor to exhibit itself as a three-
dimensional object (it folds, it bends, it occupies the gallery). Kodak’s high-tech sublime 
is brought down to earth, and with it the equally overwrought rhetoric of photography. 
What was once thought to be a window onto the world is transformed into an opaque, 
resistant surface volumetrically unfolding in space. In each of these cases, we are forced 
to look at photography rather than through it.”148 Another photographer, Alan Chasanoff, 
decides to defeat a major shortcoming of photography, its lack of three-dimensionality, 
painting over his photographs, on the object that he shots or on special transparent plates,                                                         147 Martínez, Amalia, De Andy Warhol a Cindy Shermann. Arte del siglo XX, Servicio de 
Publicaciones de la Universidad Politécnica de Valencia, 2000, p. 222, our translation. 
148 Batchen, Geoffrey, “Post-photography”, Each Wild Idea, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002, 
p. 109-110. 
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that he interposes between the objects and the camera, and “in this way he recovers, for 
photography, one of the essential strengths of painting.”149  
Given this state of affairs, can be legitimately said about photography that is still 
photography? Contemplating the history of photography from its inception till today, 
things appear to have been complicated themselves a lot: “It used to be said that 
photography was tormented by the ghost of painting. Used to be said. For now 
photography is the one that is doing the haunting. Where once art photography was 
measured according to the conventions and aesthetic values of the painted image, today 
the situation is decidedly more complicated. Over the past two decades, the boundary 
between photography and other media like painting, sculpture, or performance has 
become increasingly porous. It would seem that each medium has absorbed the other, 
leaving the photographic residing everywhere, but nowhere in particular. A number of 
critics have also lamented the loss of photography’s ‘truth effect’ under the pressure of 
new photographic simulation technologies. These critics draw a distinction between 
photography as a direct inscription of a referent in the world and the photographic as a 
practice dependent on the recirculation of already existing codes and images. The 
suggestion is that a diminution of our collective faith in the photograph’s indexical 
relationship to the real will inevitably lead to the death of photography as an autonomous 
medium. The irony of this scenario is that photography as a separate entity might well be 
on the verge of disappearing forever, even as the photographic as a rich vocabulary of 
conventions and references lives on in ever-expanding splendor. In short, it appears we 
have already entered a «post-photography», that moment after but not yet beyond 
photography.”150 
So what’s left of the Purism after this massacre of the photographic realism? It’s 
obvious, it situated itself on the side of the faction – or it is even the vital force of this                                                         149 Lemagny, Jean-Claude, “La photographie inquiète d’elle même (1950-1980)”, in Lemagny, 
Jean-Claude et Rouillé, André (eds.), Histoire de la photographie, Bordas, 1993, our translation, p. 
226. 150 Batchen, Geoffrey, “Post-photography”, Each Wild Idea, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 
2002, p. 109. 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faction – that criticizes and condemns the current condition of photography, that deplores 
the loss of indexicality, the distortion of the nature of the medium, the contamination 
from the part of other practices, the extinction of the unadulterated straight shot, of 
spontaneity, of confidence, of certainty, of innocence… Well, it seems that photography 
lost its innocence. It simply grew up. 
 
Was Narcissus murdered and berried? Or is still secretly cherished? 
Unlike the other Greek hero, Œdipus – equally exploited by psychoanalysis – , that 
tragically and dignifyingly decided to take his own life, Narcissus seems to be a more 
resilient guy. He may look delicate and foolish, while vainly admires his mirrored face in 
the water, but deep down his frivolous shallow appearance lies a conservation instinct 
that would have prevented even the extinction of the dinosaurs. It’s true, on the other 
hand, that neither Œdipus died, he just went blind. Well, too bad for him, maybe this is 
why Narcissus was considered more suitable for the photographer’s job… 
But after so much mirroring, even Narcissus can get bored sometimes. You cannot 
indefinitely watch the same thing, over and over, without at least dipping your finger in 
the water, make the image undulate, blur, multiply. What’s bad in seeing more Narcissus 
than only one? The more, the better. It’s just what photographers started to do after the 
golden era of Purism – the monopoly of Stieglitz, Weston, Adams and the others – began 
to lessen. The newcomers began stirring the water with the finger, at first, shyly, and then 
with more guts and more imagination. The avant-garde, with its open-minded “New 
Vision”, the innovations of the Surrealist photographers, the desire to experiment and to 
infringe to frontiers, equals to a beautiful maturing of the Narcissus, who acknowledges 
the existence of other things beyond his own person, and realizes that sane and 
commonsensical differentiation between his ego and reality, externalizing reality and 
putting it where it was supposed to be – out there. Following this understanding, he also 
understands that reality can be manipulated, toyed with, handled, without anything bad 
happening to him. Because reality is not him. 
  73 
The water muddles significantly in the Postmodern years. You could almost swear 
that the arrogant Narcissus was despicably murdered together with the declared death of 
the author, disseminated by Barthes and Foucault. An apparent altruism and selflessness, 
totally opposed to the egocentrism of the Narcissism, must be the reason for such 
generous display and sharing, right? The wild game goes even further and it is ascribed to 
the observer, to the consumer, the essential role in the arena of arts. “Given that one 
writes while reading”, emphasize Nicolas Bourriaud, resuming the sayings of Roland 
Barthes and Paul Valery, “and that a work of art is produced from the position of the 
observer, the receiver becomes the central figure of culture – detrimentally to the cult of 
the author.”151 But this is a crazy perspective, and Bourriaud puts the finger on it – 
“nevertheless, if the «open artwork», interactive or participative, such as a happening by 
Allan Kaprow, gives a certain freedom to the receiver, it does not allow him to do 
nothing more than reacting to the initial impulse submitted by the donor; partaking meant 
completing the proposed scheme.”152 The ironic comparison inherent in Barthes’s 
syntagma “God-author” reveals exactly what it says, namely the ominous and omnipotent 
self-image that the little child has about himself: he thinks he’s God, even if he doesn’t 
know who God is – and he doesn’t even need to, because it is supposed that this early 
feeling is the source of the idea of God, later externalized and projected onto a 
overpowering alien-like entity. So when Barthes and other revolutionary theorics of the 
time decide to kill the God-author, they are only unveiling the tremendous Narcissism 
that lurks in the postmodern author, Narcissism that already became unbearable and must 
be shaken off. But this crime is not a facile crime, and neither is desirable, because 
Narcissus must not be murdered, only tempered and tamed and taught the good manners, 
and killing him only results in a more ferocious resuscitation the first time he gets the 
chance to do it. 
 
                                                        
151 Bourriaud, Nicolas, Post producción. La cultura como escenario: modos en que el arte 
reprograma el mundo contemporáneo, Adriana Hidalgo editora, p. 114. 152 Bourriaud, Nicolas, ibid., p. 115. 
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Cindy Sherman – Untitled Film Stills 
This resuscitation takes places in whatever it is that we call contemporary epoch – 
the literality of Narcissism, its plain factuality is puzzling and at the same time 
entertaining. After the guerilla combat of the Postmodernism, Narcissus makes his star-
like appearance with no shame at all, rejuvenated and ready for the party. He went back 
to mirroring, just like that, but now he doesn’t hide anymore, he does it in front of 
anybody and what’s more, is that he wants to be seen and mirrored back. One of the most 
notorious examples is the work of photographer Cindy Sherman, who “only photographs 
herself”, as curator and writer Susan Bright observes, “using the stereotyped appearance 
of a specific type of photography”.153 The underlying idea is to undermine the 
conventional of the construction of the “feminine” in contemporary society, by ridiculing 
these facets all too forced and artificial. The carrying out of this intention is admirable, 
Sherman proving to be both a versatile model and a resourceful photographer. But 
beyond this well-argumented theory that constitutes the basis of this lengthy project, the 
question is why not using models? To that, she answers: “At some moment, I tried to use 
relatives or friends for the photographs, and once I hired an assistant. But I didn’t feel 
comfortable […] I also realized that I don’t know either what I’m looking for in a 
photograph, so it is even more complicated to explain it to someone else. When I’m 
doing it, I use a mirror in order to reach to something that I don’t know what it is until I 
see it.”154 But isn’t it that this impossibility to work with someone else comes, on one                                                         
153 Bright, Susan, Fotografía hoy, Nerea, San Sebastián, 2005, p 24, our translation. 154 Sherman, Susan, quoted in Bright, Susan, Fotografía hoy, Nerea, San Sebastián, 2005, p 24, our 
translation. 
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hand, from the incapacity to empathize with another person, to identify with her, or at 
least to convey to the other her own vision, which basically means incapacity to accept 
the fact that there are other egos, the lack of interest in other egos, and on the other hand 
from the desire to always mirror herself and only herself? 
 
 
Sam Taylor-Wood – Self-portraits (2004) 
Sam Taylor-Wood portrays herself in her studio in postures that resemble levitation. 
“Her self-portraits often reflect important chapters in her life and are signals of change or 
progress. Together, they constitute an important autobiographical thread that integrates in 
her work.”155 Elina Brotherus, like many other contemporary photographers, composes 
visual diaries of her life. In an interview, she was telling that she made the series 
Wedding Portraits (1997) when she got married, the series Divorce Portraits (1998) 
when she divorced and I hate sex (1998) when she felt that way.156  
 
Elina Brotherus – Miroir (2001 
                                                        155 Bright, Susan, Fotografía hoy, Nerea, San Sebastián, 2005, p. 30, our translation. 
156 http://www.futuropasado.com/?p=728 
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Nikky S. Lee “transforms herself in members of different social and ethnic groups, 
transcending so the age, the social class, the race and the gender, performing very diverse 
roles. In her ‘projects’, she becomes a yuppie, a lesbian, a Hispanic and an old person”.157 
Sometimes, Nikki S. Lee isn’t even the one who takes the photos, this function can be 
performed by any other member of the “group”. Everything revolves around her person, 
concentrates on the essential – seeing and being seen. Or seeing that is being seen, when 
later she and the others can see her photos taken by someone else. One more detail: after 
making the photos, she cuts off the man in the image, leaving only a little clue that he has 
been there – usually the hand. Probably the supporting role must leave enough stage for 
the star. 
 
 
Nikki S. Lee – Parts (2003) 
 
Gillian Wearing’s disguises are going even further – she transcends the sex, the 
gender and the time. For her project Album, she realizes the incredible trickery of 
becoming, turn by turn, her mother, her father, her sister and her brother. The artist is at 
this moment complete, is androgynous, like God, actually. Obviously, a child looks, in a 
certain degree, like his mother, his father, his sister and his brother, so maybe it is not so 
hard to become them in disguise, but what is the reason of the desire to do it? Isn’t it in 
order to fulfill a childhood forgotten fantasy, where he/she imitates parent’s voices, tries 
                                                        157 Bright, Susan, Fotografía hoy, Nerea, San Sebastián, 2005, p. 40, our translation. 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on their clothes, emulates their personalities, imagining eventually that he doesn’t need 
them anymore, that he is self-sufficient. 
 
Gillian Wearing – Album (2003) 
Obviously, the self-portrait isn’t and never was something new in photography, but 
the exhaustive manner in which is practiced today says something about the land 
conquered by the contemporary Narcissus: his prevalence, his acceptance, his 
normalization. Today, Narcissus is the norm. 
All these self-portrait addicted photographers say the same thing – that those people 
in the pictures are not them, that they are assuming foreign identities, as if doing so, 
extracting themselves from the territory of the ego, they are distracting the attention away 
from themselves. But even if the ego is not there, the id is there, the unconscious, that 
confers the force of its libido to all these “foreign” identities and constructions. 
Unfortunately, this type of Narcissism is like a drug, it is never enough, and that first 
perfection, experienced in childhood, will never get to be re-experienced at the same 
ecstatic height.  
On a more ironic, or sometimes nostalgic note, other contemporary photographers 
are teasing Narcissus with surprising installation and ideas. Columbian artist Oscar 
Muñoz “deposits on the floor of the exhibition room twelve or more glass trays, filled 
with water, over which he spills carbon powder through a silk screen onto which he 
previously copied, by means of a procedure similar to that used in serigraphy, his own id 
photo. The resulting image is, obviously, extremely precarious and instable: it is enough 
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that the tray containing it receive the slightest vibration for the image to alter. […] The 
work, in this initial phase, has the obvious signification anticipated by the title. Just like 
any other Narcissus, the artist delivers himself to the fascination of seeing his own face 
reflected in the water. […] 
                        
                          Oscar Muñoz’s fading away carbon-made pictures 
As the water in the trays end up by evaporating – at the end of a process that can 
take weeks and that, on the contrary of the photographic instant, has a specific and 
contingent duration, the work seems to close upon itself. On the bottom of the tray 
remains imprinted in carbon Muñoz’s image, so basic and craggy, like a bad id photo. 
Just that its aspect is unusual and irremediably funereal. Seems to be the photo of a dead 
person and evokes both Roland Barthes’ theory – that associates photography to the 
masks of archaic theater that represented the dead ones – and these disturbing verses of 
the poet Leopoldo Castilla: Cada calle es una foto / y el fotógrafo es la muerte/ La muerte 
o ese doble de la muerte que son los espectros. (Each road is a photograph / and the 
photographer is the death / The death or this double of the death, that is the specter)”158 
Maybe an alternate idea, I think, would be to simply spill silver powder over the surface 
of the water in the glass trays, and so the visitors that would bow, eager to see what’s in, 
would only see their own faces. This could mean two things: first, that each of us is in 
fact looking for himself when looking at a photograph, and that each of us see something 
else in a photograph.                                                         158 Jimenez, Carlos, from "Los pliegues del instante", Revista Lápiz, núm. 128 - 129, 1997, our 
translation. 
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Maybe the post-photography that Batchen is talking about – even if it threatens 
“genuine” photography with the extinction – could mean reaching also a post-narcissistic 
stage: due to its indiscriminating ability to migrate from one art form to another, from one 
practice to another, incorporating themes, ideas, maintaining a living, interactive 
relationship with the reality, it can counteract Narcissus’ self-absorption.   
We can read, on the back cover of Jean-Claude Lemagny’s History of Photography 
that in a century and a half, photography conquered the world. Because the world enjoy 
looking at its reflection, apparently. Maybe the world enjoy more looking at its reflection 
than looking at itself, deep-down. Lewis Carroll, when he was making photographs, knew 
that people like to mirror themselves, and he also knew that they want more – they 
wanted to go beyond the mirror: it is for them that he wrote Trough the Looking-Glass, 
and it is why he didn’t call it a mirror: because it is a looking glass. Who knows, maybe 
Narcissus too was enjoying more his reflection in the water than he enjoyed his own self, 
while an entire world was accusing him that he likes to watch himself because he likes 
himself. Maybe he even hated himself, but he liked his reflection. 
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